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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial attitudes and approaches toward hypnosis and hypnotically ad-
duced evidence have oscillated markedly over the past century. Hypnosis
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issues first appeared in American courts in the late nineteenth century.' At
that time, judicial wariness of hypnosis and hostility to hypnotically adduced
evidence was manifest.2 In 1897, the California Supreme Court seemed to
speak for all American courts when it boldly declared that "the law does
not recognize hypnosis." 3 The evidentiary problem of hypnotic evidence
largely vanished shortly after the court's pronouncement. The issue remained
dormant until the late 1950s and early 1960s, when various branches of the
medical community recognized and once again widely used hypnosis.4
Medical recognition of the use of hypnosis awakened investigatory use by
law enforcement agencies, and soon the evidentiary problem of hypnotically
refreshed testimony was again before the courts.' This time, the judiciary
did not take as quite a hostile view of hypnosis. Almost two decades of
uncritical acceptance of hypnotically refreshed testimony began in the late
1960s. Towards the end of that period, in 1977, one writer stated that "[t]he
older cases, in which suspicion of such evidence [hypnotically refreshed
testimony] was sufficient to summarily deny its admissibility, are no longer
of persuasive weight." ' 6 In the same year, two other commentators boldy
asserted that courts would soon take the next step and admit statements
made by witnesses while under hypnosis.7
What these writers did not foresee was yet another change in the attitude
of a significant segment of the American judiciary.' Renewed skepticism
caused some courts to admit hypnotically refreshed testimony only after
careful scrutiny convinced them that the proposed testimony was both reliable
and probative. The same doubts caused other courts to exclude hypnotically
refreshed testimony per se. Consequently, three judicial approaches to the
question of admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony have developed.
None command a majority. The law is in a state of flux.
1. For a useful and interesting early forensic history of hypnosis, see Laurence & Perry,
Forensic Hypnosis in the Late Nineteenth Century, 31 INT'L J. CLINICAL& EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 266 (1983). For a briefer discussion, see Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of
Pretrial Hypnosis On a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313, 316-21 (1980).
2. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
3. People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 655, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897).
4. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussion of increased medical and
investigative uses of hypnosis).
5. The evidentiary problem usually at issue is the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony, i.e., the admissibility of the testimony of a witness hypnotized prior to trial. Courts
have been nearly unanimous in refusing to allow a witness to testify in court while under
hypnosis, and this article does not discuss that issue. For an interesting discussion of an
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility of testimony of a witness hypnotized on the
stand, see Teitelbaum, Admissibility of Hypnotically Adduced Evidence and the Arthur Nebb
Case, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1963).
6. Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 Oiiio N.U.L. REV.
I, 21 (1977).
7. Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence
Susceptible? 38 Oto ST. L.J. 567, 613 (1977).
8. See infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text (discussing the re-emergence of judicial
skepticism of hypnotism and development of alternative approaches to use of hypnotically
refreshed testimony).
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To place the evidentiary problem of hypnotically refreshed testimony in
proper perspective, this article first examines the nature, methodology, and
uses of hypnosis. The article then traces the development of the three
currently competing judicial approaches to hypnotically refreshed testimony.
Finally, an analysis of each approach leads to the conclusion that both the
approaches of per se exclusion and of per se admissibility contain significant
analytical flaws and practical difficulties. The approach of per se exclusion
is especially pernicious. In contrast, the third approach-guarded admissi-
bility-recognizes the risks of hypnosis but uses procedural safeguards and
balancing tests to minimize or negate those risks. This approach allows
reliable and relevant evidence to reach the trier of fact. It is, therefore,
preferable.
II. Ti ART AND SCIENCE OF HYPNOSIS
Although this article focuses on the in-court admissibility of testimony of
a previously hypnotized witness, a general review of hypnosis is first required
in order to fully understand the evidentiary concerns that confront the
judiciary. The following sections briefly survey the nature, methods, and
uses of hypnosis as a medical-therapeutic technique, and examine the utility
of that technique when its results enter a courtroom.
A. Nature and Methodology
Simply defined, hypnosis is an altered state of awareness or perception.9
This altered state of mind is characterized by "heightened suggestibility as
a result of which unusual or extraordinary changes in sensory, motor and
memory functions (cognitive processes) may be more readily experienced."' ' 0
The subject's altered state of consciousness is achieved by a process known
as induction, in which the hypnotist induces a hypnotic state with the
9. W. WESTER & A. SMITH, CLINICAL HYPNOSIS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 19 (1984).
Hypnosis has also been defined as "the act of inducing artificially a state of sleep or trance in
a subject by means of verbal suggestion by the hypnotist or by the subject's concentration upon
some object." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 668 (5th ed. 1979). The American Medical Association
has defined hypnosis as
a temporary condition of altered attention in the subject which may be induced by
another person and in which a variety of phenomena may appear spontaneously or
in response to verbal or other stimuli. These phenomena include alterations in
consciousness and memory, increased susceptibility to suggestion, and the production
in the subject of responses and ideas unfamiliar to him in his usual state of mind.
Council on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J. A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958). For
other definitions, see ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Hypnosis, 139 (15th ed. 1974), and 9 NEw
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (MACROPAEDIA) 133 (1979). Although most contemporary definitions
have much in common with one another, there appears to be no consensus on a single,
authoritative definition. "[Tihere are as many definitions as there are definers." W. KROGER,
CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 113-18 (2d ed. 1977).
10. Alderman & Barrette, Hypnosis on Trial: A Practical Perspective on the Application of
Forensic Hypnosis in Criminal Cases, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1982).
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cooperation of the subject." Various induction techniques are available, 2
but the processes have certain factors in common: the establishment of a
rapport between the subject and the hypnotist, progressive relaxation by the
subject, and progressive narrowing of the subject's attention due to the
specific suggestions by the hypnotist. The resulting hypnotic state may be
separable into several levels, or stages, with each level manifesting distinct
characteristics.' 4 A fully hypnotized subject may experience a broad range
of mental, emotional, and physical responses and effects, including altera-
tions in heartbeat and respiration, production of hallucinations and fantasies,
and recovery of forgotten memories."
Induction techniques need not be complicated. Professionals develop their
own style based on individual training and experience. Induction of hypnosis
can be direct or indirect. Use of indirect, subtle suggestions has gained
popularity among practitioners when working therapeutically with patients.
Most forensic work involves direct techniques such as progressive relaxation,
eye fixation, or imagery. The subjects are simply asked to close their eyes
and then given suggestions that all of the muscles of their bodies are relaxing
in a progressive way from the top of their head to their toes. The progression
can be followed with a "deepening" technique, such as asking the subject
to count or to imagine being in their favorite place. A variety of "tests"
can be used to check on the level and depth of a trance.' 6
There is some controversy about the level and depth of a trance. Some
practitioners believe that it is important for the subject to achieve a very
deep trance in order for hypnosis to be effective. Others experts believe that
II. W. KROGER, supra note 9, at 36-37. Hypnotic states are commonplace occurrences in
daily life, and neither are they induced by a professional hypnotist nor is the subject aware of
being hypnotized.
Hypnotic phenomena are common in everyday experiences, albeit rarely recog-
nized as such. Examples include the lulling of an infant to sleep, advertising, and
involvement with a spell-binding orator, a skillful advocate, or a good entertainer.
Although each of these occurrences involves the superconcentrated state of mind
that results in an increased susceptibility to suggestion that is typical of the hypnotic
state, these occasions of indirect susceptibility are distinguishable from an induced
hypnotic state. Under direct [sic) susceptibility, a person might respond fleetingly
to a variety of suggestive stimuli, whereas in induced hypnosis, the suggestible state
is purposefully created to permit the subject to be guided by the hypnotist. Under
the influence of indirect suggestion, the subject is generally unaware of his unusually
responsive condition, and therefore, may succumb to harmful suggestions. In
induced hypnosis, however, the subject is aware of his vulnerability and remains
capable of protecting himself from harmful suggestion.
Spector & Foster, supra note 7, at 567 (footnotes omitted).
12. See W. KROGER, supra note 9, at 11-22.
13. H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIo N 156-59 (1967); W. HIBBARD & R.
WORRING, FOREN SIC HYPNOSIS 64-90 (1981).
14. H. ARONS, supra note 13, at 137; Spector & Foster, supra note 7, at 571-72.
15. Spector & Foster, supra note 7, at 570-71; E. HILGARD, THE EXPERIENCE OF HYPNOSIS
6-10 (1968); G. ULETT & D. PETERSON, APPLIED HYPNOSIS AND POSITIVE SUGGESTION 1-13 (1965).
16. For a more detailed discussion of various techniques used to induce a hypnotic state,
see W. KROGER, supra note 9, at 11-22.
[Vol. 35:77
1985] HYPNOTICALL Y REFRESHED TESTIMONY 81
the subject will develop the proper depth of trance in order to reach a
predetermined goal. Under this latter view, a light-medium state is appro-
priate in most cases.
One of the older scales of trance level was devised in 1931, and is still
used to demonstrate the kinds of phenomena associated with the different
stages of trances:
1) Hypnoidal - general relaxation, fluttering of the eyelids, eye closure
and complete physical relaxation;
2) Light trance - catalepsy of the eyes, limb catalepsies, rigid catalepsy,
and glove anesthesia;
3) Medium trance - partial amnesia, post-hypnotic anesthesia, personality
changes, simple post-hypnotic suggestions, kinesthetic delusions, and
complete amnesia; and
4) Deep (somnambulistic) trance - eye open trance, bizarre post-hypnotic
suggestions, complete somnambulism, positive and negative visual and
auditory hallucinations, and post-hypnotic amnestic. 7
A forensic hypnosis session usually consists of four phases: pre-hypnosis,
induction and trance-deepening, recall, and termination. The most common
techniques used to elicit information and to enhance recall include: age
regression, revivification, screen techniques, and hyperamnesia. 8 In age
regression, the hypnotist directs the subject back to a particular age in the
subject's life, enabling the subject to role-play the age, including age-appro-
priate behavior. 9 In revivification, the subject actually relives a past event,
once again experiencing all of the cognitive, emotive, and sensory factors
present at the time of the event. 20 Screen techniques are a form of regression
in which subjects are told that they can see the past event(s) in question
unfolding on a movie or television screen. Hyperamnesia is the simplest of
the memory restoration techniques. This technique enables recall simply as
a result of the relaxation effect produced by hypnosis; by allowing the mind
to release memories stored in the subconscious even though the subject could
not release them volitionally while not hypnotized.2 ' The first three methods,
respectively, require the subject to role-play, relive, or watch past events as
they happened and to describe them in detail. Hyperamnesia is of greater
use as an enhancement technique when a subject remembers portions of an
event but is unsure of the details.
B. History and Uses of Hypnosis
Hypnosis has had a long, colorful, and somewhat checkered history. While
17. Davis & Husband, A Study of Hypnotic Susceptibility in Relation to Personality Traits,
26 J. ABNORMAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY, 175, 175-82 (1931). See also Spector & Foster, supra note
7, at 571-72.
18. See R. UDOLF, FOREN SIC HYPNOSIS (1983).
19. See R. REIF, HYPNOTIC AGE REGRESSION (1959); W. KROGER, supra note 9, at 11-22.
20. W. KROGER, supra note 9, at 16-17.
21. Id. See also White, Fox, & Harris, Hyperamnesia for Recently Learned Material, 35 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 88 (1968).
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the nature of the phenomena of hypnosis was not understood until relatively
recently, the practice of hypnosis is at least as old as recorded civilization.22
Although primitive practitioners may have used hypnosis to establish and
maintain their positions of tribal power, the primary historical use of hyp-
nosis has been therapeutic." Hypnosis was used by Assyrian and Babylonian
priests over fifty centuries ago to cure various afflications. Induced hypnosis
was a regular form of therapy in Egyptian "sleep temples" over thirty
centuries ago.24 It was similarly practiced by doctors and medicine men in
ancient India, Africa, and pre-Columbian America. 25
Hypnosis acquired a negative image during the Middle Ages, in Christian
Europe, where it became known more as an evil power than a natural and
beneficial practice. Hypnotists "were considered agents of the devil victim-
izing helpless subjects under their strange spells." 26
Early attempts to establish hypnosis as a science, or more accurately, as
a pseudo science, are attributable to the efforts of Franz Mesmer, a Viennese
physician in Paris, who attracted attention in the late eighteenth century.
Mesmer developed a theory and practice of medical therapy that he called
"animal magnetism. 2 7 He believed that all reality was filled with an invisible
fluid, that illness was the product of an imbalance of this fluid in the body,
and that by using magnets and an elaborate ritual, he had the power to cure
illness by increasing the flow of magnetic fluids in the body. 2
Mesmer placed his patients in a tub filled with glass, iron filings, and cold
water. Wearing flowing robes, and accompanied by soft background music,
Mesmer would touch iron rods protruding from the tub to the afflicted parts
of his patient's body. This practice would induce a "convulsive crisis" in
the patient. 29 In reality, the "crisis" was "a true state of hypnosis, produced
through suggestion and the patient's own beliefs and expectations of cure." 30
Mesmer and 'his techniques were thoroughly discredited by an investigatory
commission of the French government. 3 It was not until the middle of the
nineteenth century that an English physician, James Braid, was successful
in bringing a measure of scientific credibility to hypnosis.3 2
Additional incremental research and experimentation during the next cen-
tury resulted in the gradual use, popularity, understanding, and legitimacy
of hypnosis. In 1955, the British Medical Association officially endorsed
22. S. KREBS, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF HYPNOSIS 3-4 (rev. ed. 1957).
23. Douce, Hypnosis: A Scientific Aid in Crime Detection, 46 POLICE CHIEF 60 (May, 1979).
24. Id.
25. Id. See also S. KaEs, supra note 22, at 3-4.
26. Douce, supra note 23, at 60.
27. K. BOWERS, HYPNOSIS FOR THE SERIOUSLY CURIOUS 7-8 (1976).
28. G. ULETT & D. PETERSON, supra note 15, at 7-8.
29. K. BOWERS, supra note 27, at 7-8.
30. Douce, supra note 23, at 60.
31. K. BOWERS, supra note 27, at 8-9.
32. Douce, supra note 23, at 60. Braid coined the word hypnosis, after Hypnos, the Greek
god of sleep. Realizing later that the nature of hypnosis was not that of sleep, he tried to
change the name, but the term had already become established. Id.
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hypnosis as a therapeutic technique.33 The American Medical Association
gave a similar endorsement in 1958, stating that hypnosis has "a recognized
place on the medical armamentarium and is a useful technique in the
treatment of certain illnesses . . . .,, Two years later, the American Psy-
chological Association recognized hypnosis as a branch of psychology by
establishing a special Hypnosis Division." Today, hypnosis is widely accepted
by the various branches of the medical community. It is used to treat various
illnesses and addictions, including smoking, asthma, burns, chronic pain,
grief, impotency, obesity, migraine and tension headaches, and warts.36
C. Forensic Application and Benefits
The growing popularity and use of hypnosis by the medical community
for therapeutic purposes ultimately stimulated an interest in and use of
hypnosis for forensic purposes.3" Since one of the traditional salient uses of
hypnosis was memory restoration and enhancement, the technique appeared
to have great potential for law enforcement agencies as an aid in enhancing
the memory of witnesses and victims.3 8
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, many of the dangers and deficiencies
of hypnosis as a memory refreshing device were unknown,39 and evidentiary
problems relating to the testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses had
not yet manifested themselves in court. At the same time, the number of
psychiatrists and psychologists professionally trained in hypnotic techniques
was not extremely large, and the services of these individuals were fairly
expensive. Moreover, it is easy for laymen to learn quickly the techniques
of hypnotic induction, at least superficially ° Thus, for one or more of the
above reasons, a pattern emerged in which many law enforcement agencies
did not rely exclusively upon trained psychiatrists and psychologists to
perform hypnosis, but instead established ad hoc and regular training pro-
grams for their own personnel.
By 1978, police in many large cities and agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau, had received
33. D. CHEEK & L. LECRON, CLINICAL HYPNOTHERAPY 19 (1968).
34. Council on Mental Health, supra note 9, at 187.
35. E. HILGARD, HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY 4 (1965) (Division 30).
36. The Admissibility of Hypnotically Induced Recollection, 70 Ky. L.J. 187, 190 n. 18
(1981-82). Hypnosis is also utilized in certain investigations of various physiological systems,
primarily the cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, and sensory systems, but including also the renal,
respiratory, and endocrine systems. Hypnosis is employed in the study of areas such as emotions,
psychopathology, defense mechanisms, dreams, physiological processes, and test validation.
Spector & Foster, supra note 7, at 579 n.66.
37. See generally Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL
& EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOsIs 358 (1979).
38. Monrose, Justice with Glazed Eyes: The Growing Use of Hypnotism in Law Enforce-
ment, 8 JURIs DR. 54 (1978).
39. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (examples of such dangers and deficiencies).
40. See generally Diamond, supra note 1.
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hypnosis training. 4' By 1981, thousands of detectives and police officers, at
local, state, and federal levels, also had received some hypnosis training.4 2
Recently, there has been increased attention and effort in the law enforcement
field to standardize training procedures and improve the competency of law
enforcement practitioners of hypnosis. 43 Perhaps this is partly because of
growing criticism by professional and scholarly organizations of the use of
hypnosis by inadequately trained law enforcement personnel," and partly
because of growing judicial concerns about evidentiary problems related to
the testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses. 4'
Hypnosis is of significant potential benefit not only to law enforcement
authorities in criminal investigations, but also to criminal civil lawyers in the
pre-trial discovery process. A witness may have been the victim of a crime
or accident who suffered physical and/or emotional trauma that caused
varying degrees of amnesia or psychological blocking of their memory. A
witness may suffer trauma and a consequent memory loss, or block the
experience simply by witnessing a crime or tragic event. A witness may have
a poor memory or their memory may have eroded due to the passage of
time. In all of these examples, hypnosis may provide considerable assistance
to the witness in recovering lost or repressed memories.
Alternatively, a witness may have a perfectly normal memory, that none-
theless could be further enhanced through hypnosis. As one forensic hypnosis
expert explains:
Hypnosis, much like a surgeon's scalpel, cuts through inhibitory fears
enabling the subject to experience a relaxed, concentrated state of aware-
ness in which all five senses are heightened to a marked degree. He thinks
and remembers better because the conscious mind swings aside permitting
direct access to the vast repository of the subconscious.-
41. Id. at 313-14. This is not to say that local police invariably received the same training
as federal agents. Generally, federal agents' training is more extensive; unlike many local police
forces, federal agencies do not allow their own personnel to perform hypnosis. When hypnosis
is used as an investigative tool by federal agencies, only medical professionals may induce
hypnosis. See Ault, FBI Guidelines for Use of Hypnosis, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNosIs 449, 449-51 (1979).
42. Graham, Should Our Courts Reject Hypnosis? St. Louis Post Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1981,
cited in Margolin & Coliver, Forensic Uses of Hypnosis: An Update, TRIAL, Oct. 1983, at 45,
105 n.2; Feldman, Hypnosis: Look Me in the Eyes and Tell Me That's Admissible, BARRISTER,
Spring 1981, at 4, 54.
43. For example, the Michigan Society for Investigative and Forensic Hypnosis was founded
in 1981 to address the concerns of competency in the application of hypnosis for investigative
purposes. Powell, Law Enforcement Hypnosis in Michigan, 32 L. & ORDER 52 (1984). "The
organization consists of law enforcement officers as well as health care professionals. Proof of
successful completion of an approved course of study, as well as demonstrated proficiency, are
prerequisites for membership in this organization." Id. at 52.
44. See, e.g., 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOsIs 452, 453 (1979) (resolutions
passed by Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis in October 1978 and by International
Society of Hypnosis in August 1979).
45. See infra notes 182-215 and accompanying text.
46. Douce, supra note 23, at 60. "The use of hypnosis often helps an eyewitness more
accurately recall the incident, including many important details that would not have been
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D. Problems with Hypnosis in a Forensic Setting
Although hypnosis is a valuable procedure for memory retrieval and
enhancement, its use is not without dangers. The hypnotic state is one of
heightened suggestibility. In this state there is the danger that false memories
will be created by the subject's desire to please, by his expectations of
appropriate behavior for hypnotized individuals, or by his ready acceptance
of either deliberate suggestions or inadvertent cues by the hypnotist .4  The
subject may confabulate, attempting to fill in gaps in his memory with logical
deductions of what should have occured s.4  Fantasies known as "screen
memories" may be produced by the subject as a defense to prevent the
retrieval of real but traumatic memories.4 9 Hypnosis does not guarantee
historical accuracy. Therefore, hypnotic recall may contain error or distortion
due to the erosion of memory over time and/or the subconscious intermin-
gling of memory of the original event with memory of subsequent eventsA0
Lastly, it is also possible for a subject to willfully lie if he is motivated to
protect himself or another person."
It must be emphasized that these problems are not peculiar to hypnotized
subjects.12 Moreover, many of these problems are avoidable by using hypnosis
only with appropriate subjects and under appropriate circumstances. Hyp-
nosis makes "no promises other than to confuse, mislead, and misdirect
resources if it is not carefully applied." 3 It should not be viewed as a "short
cut" in the investigative process. Hypnosis should be used sparingly, in
serious and difficult cases in which there are no suspects, or where there are
disinterested but forgetful or traumatized witnesses and there is a likelihood
that information derived from hypnosis can be independently verified. 4
remembered otherwise, it is possible that the relationship with the hypnotist provides a com-
fortable setting which makes it easier for the person to remember .... " Schafer & Rubio,
Hypnosis to Aid the Recall of Witnesses, 26 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 81
(1978). In one recent study, a hypnotized group of subjects recalled twice as much information
as did a non-hypnotized control group. Unfortunately, the hypnotized group also made three
times as many errors. Dockasi, Validity of Hypnosis-Enhanced Testimony Questioned, TRIAL,
Dec. 1983, at 6 (citing findings of study published in SCIENCE, Oct. 14, 1983, 184-85).
47. Kroger & Douce, supra note 37, at 366; Spector & Foster, supra note 7, at 591.
48. Dilloff, supra note 6, at 4, 5.
49. See generally Kroger & Douce, Forensic Uses of Hypnosis, 23 Am. J. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 86-93 (1980).
50. Id.
51. Dilloff, supra note 6, at 5. It is for this reason that a suspect in a crime is never an
appropriate subject for hypnosis.
52. See infra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
53. Hibler, Forensic Hypnosis: To Hypnotize, or Not to Hypnotize, That Is the Question
27 AM. J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 52, 55 (1984).
54. The investigative departments of the Armed Forces, the Secret Service, the Treasury
Department, and the FBI have established a single standard for the use of hypnosis. Id. These
guidelines, known as the Federal Model, ensure the proper use of hypnosis with appropriate
subjects. For these reasons, the authors recommend the model as the ideal standard for
investigative uses of hypnosis. The Federal Model is discussed at greater length infra notes 276-
80 and accompanying text.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Restricting hypnosis to proper subjects and investigative uses is not suf-
ficient to avoid hypnotic hazards. The key safety factors are the training
and conduct of the hypnotist.55 One does not need to be a surgeon to make
an abdominal incision, but training in medicine and surgery is essential in
knowing what to do next. Similarly, induction techniques are easily learned,
but when hypnosis is performed by an unqualified person, the results can
be detrimental to the interests of justice and to the health of the subject.
Hypnosis should therefore be conducted by a competent professional "pos-
sessing an advanced level of training and experience directly related to
eyewitness recall, hypnosis, and the application of forensic hypnosis tech-
niques. ' '5 6
Ideally, the hypnosis professional should be a psychiatrist or a psychologist
whose qualifications and conduct are regulated by state statutes and admin-
istrative regulations as well as by professional codes.57 These professionals
can use recall techniques appropriate for the particular type of memory loss
from which the patient suffers. They are also skilled in the art of using non-
leading questions and appropriate suggestions designed to minimize the
possibility of distorted recall.5" Moreover, the trained professional can detect
behavior which indicates that the subject wants to help so badly that they
are risking distortion by pushing themselves. Finally, the professional can
employ a variety of techniques to deal with this problem.5 9
The reliability of procedures used and the qualifications of the hypnosis
specialist are valid evidentiary concerns. As will be seen in the following
sections, courts have proposed safeguards that adequately address these
concerns.60
Ill. THE CASE LAW
Although hypnosis has had nearly a century of legal history in the United
States, 6' it has had little impact upon case law until recently. Most judicial
55. See Dilloff, supra note 6, at 7.
56. Timm, The Factors Theoretically Affecting the Impact of Forensic Hypnosis Techniques
on Eyewitness Recall, 11 J. POLICE SCI. & ADM. 442, 448 (1983).
57. Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 311, 335 (1979); accord Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of Refreshing
Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 J. A.M.A. 1918, 1923 (1985). All states now require
licensing for psychologists. Typical state legislation establishes administrative boards with the
authority to reprimand, suspend, or revoke licenses of psychologists for practicing in areas for
which they are untrained. Hypnosis is a recognized area of specialization of psychology. The
American Society of Clinical Hypnosis sets stringent training standards, which the Federal
Model incorporates by reference. See Hibler, Investigative Aspects of Forensic Hypnosis, in W.
WESTER & W. SMITH, CLINICAL HYPNOSIS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 555-57 (1984).
58. See, e.g., Mutter, The Use of Hypnosis with Defendants, 27 AM. J. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 42, 44-47 (1984).
59. Id.
60. See infra notes 133-55 and accompanying text. See also Timm, Suggested Guidelines
for the Use of Forensic Hypnosis Techniques in Police Investigations, 29 J. FORENSIC Sci. 865
(1984).
61. See generally Laurence & Perry, supra note I.
[Vol. 35:77
1985] HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY 87
activity has taken place only within the past twenty years, and that activity
has centered on the question of the admissibility of testimony from a
previously hypnotized witness.
A. Brief History and Contemporary Patterns
The earliest hypnosis cases appeared during the twenty-year period from
1895-1915. In these cases, counsel for the defense used hypnosis as a defense
to a crime 62 or advanced the admissibility of exculpatory statements made
by a defendant under hypnosis.63 Other cases dealt with alleged seduction of
the hypnotized subject by the hypnotist. 64 One scholar summed up the early
judicial history of hypnosis:
[iJudicial hostility was manifest, and in none of these cases did the
interjection of the hypnosis issue have any appreciable effect. The result
was that just as suddenly as the problem of hypnosis had become important
in American criminal law, so it lost its importance, and from 1915 until
1950, there was but one reported case dealing with any medical-legal aspect
of hypnosis. 61
62. People v. Worthington, 105 Cal. 166, 38 P. 689 (1895). In Worthington a young woman
was given a revolver by her husband, along with a husbandly instruction that she should use
the revolver to murder the paramour she had acquired while her husband was abroad. She
complied, was found guilty of second-degree murder, and was sentenced to 25 years in prison.
She appealed raising the defenses of insanity and hypnotism. On the defense of hypnotic
influence, the appellate court held:
The [trial] court ruled out the evidence, and, I think, rightly. There was no evidence
which tended to show that the defendant was subject to the disease (hypnosis), if
it be such. Merely showing that she was told to kill the deceased, and that she did
it does not prove hypnotism, or, at least, does not tend to establish a defense to a
charge of murder.
Id. at 172, 38 P. at 691.
63. People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
64. State v. Donovan, 128 Iowa 44, 102 N.W. 791 (1905) Austin v. Baker, 110 App. Div.
510, 96 N.Y. Supp. 814 (1906) (civil action for seduction); Tyrone v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 493,
180 S.W. 125 (1915) (seduction asserted as provocation for homicide). In Donovan, the plaintiff
prevailed, with the court holding that a combination of flattery, love-making, and hypnotism
was sufficient to find seduction. In Austin, however, the defendant prevailed. The plaintiff
alleged that she had been seduced as a result of hypnotic suggestion, and given a suggestion
that she would forget the incident later. The defendant produced testimony by two medical
doctors who were skeptical that the plaintiff could have been made to forget her acts of
intercourse with the defendant, especially since she was allegedly a virgin prior to the incidents.
65. Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25 Oro ST. L.J.
1, 2 (1964) (citations omitted). The "one reported case" referred to by Professor Herman was
the 1930 case of Louis v. State, 24 Ala. App. 120, 130 So. 904 (1930). In Louis, the defendant
allegedly used hypnosis to obtain money from his victim. The appellate court reversed his
conviction for robbery, accepting the argument that mere hypnotism of the victim was insuf-
ficient to establish the necessary element of force or fear required for the crime of robbery.
Apparently, it did not occur to the prosecution to charge the defendant with larceny by trick
nor did it occur to the court to apply the doctrine of constructive force.
In the year following Professor Herman's time reference (1915-1950), a New York court
held an inculpatory statement by a defendant under hypnosis to be inadmissible on the grounds
that it was an involuntary confession. People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
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While there have been exceptions,6 the overwhelming authority in this
skimpy line of cases since 1895 is that statements made by the defendant
under or as a result of hypnosis are inadmissible. It does not matter whether
the statements were made in or out of court or whether they were made on
a voluntary or involuntary basis. 67 Judicial rationale for this exclusion has,
of course, varied with the facts of each case, but generally has ranged from
"bald conclusions that such evidence is prima facie inadmissible ' 68 to jus-
tifications such as "the self-serving and hearsay nature of the accused's
exculpatory statements, the involuntary nature of a defendant's statements
which have proven to be inculpatory, and the lack of qualifications of the
hypnotist.' '69
As previously discussed, official approval and increased use of hypnosis
by the various branches of the medical community in the 1950s and 1960s
gave impetus to a similar increased forensic use of hypnosis in criminal
investigations and in the discovery process generally. This reawakening con-
sequently produced a profusion of previously hypnotized witnesses. The
eventual result has been a flurry of judicial activity in the past two decades
on an issue that previously had been largely dormant. Now, however, the
context is somewhat different since the previously hypnotized witnesses are
generally not defendants, but victims. Even more commonly, they are neither
victims nor defendants but simply individuals who have witnessed a crime
or accident who have been hypnotized in the process of their cooperation
with litigating attorneys and/or law enforcement agencies.
Should the courts exclude the testimony of these individuals as they had
previously excluded the testimony of defendant witnesses? In addressing the
issue, the courts have groped for decisional rationales, used different tests,
applied the same tests in different ways, and, not surprisingly, reached
different conclusions. "Judicial analysis of hypnosis," as two commentators
have noted, "has been uncertain, if not inconsistent, in finding an appro-
priate definition of the qualities of hypnosis, and thus the proper application,
if any, of hypnosis to the resolution of disputes within the judicial system."7 0
The result of this uncertainty and inconsistency is a drastic and continuing
66. See, e.g., State v. Nebb, No. 39,540 (Ohio C.P., Franklin County, May 28, 1962). By
stipulation of counsel, the defendant was hypnotized before the jury and.testified while under
hypnosis. After questioning by both the prosecutor and the defense counsel, the state reduced
the charge of first degree murder to that of manslaughter, to which the defendant eventually
pled guilty. The case is the focal point of the article by Herman, supra note 65.
67. Dilloff, supra note 6, at 11-12.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id. (footnotes omitted). Dilloff observed that just because testimony from hypnotized
witnesses is not generally admissible there is no reason for the courts to prohibit the use of
hypnosis to assist the defense where defense counsel believes such assistance may be helpful.
Indeed, Dilloff cites Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959), in which
the refusal to allow the defendant's attorney to employ a hypnotist in an effort to enable the
accused to recall crucial events was held to be an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Id. at
14.
70. Alderman & Barrette, supra note 10, at 6.
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splintering of opinion among jurisdictions. Worse, many state high courts
find themselves in the embarrassingly sticky situation of rendering authori-
tative pronouncements, only to modify or overrule their decisions within a
few years, or, in some cases, within a few months. What had become the
majority position in the states over a period of time from ten to twenty
years ago has, during just the past few years, been relegated to a distinct
minority position. As of 1985, there is no majority position among the states
on the issue of admissibility of hypnotically influenced testimony. Three
different approaches have emerged. 7'
B. The Admissibility Approach
Courts using the admissibility approach will admit hypnotically influenced
testimony, leaving to the trier of fact the role of according the proper weight
to such testimony. The modern case that established this approach was
Harding v. State.72
In Harding, the previously hypnotized witness was not a defendant, but
a victim who had been abducted, raped, and shot. There was corroborative
evidence to support her claim, and evidence showing that she was with the
alleged assailants during the night in question. The trauma, however, had
impaired the victim's memory. Her recollection of events varied during her
first three interviews with the police. At the instigation of the police, the
victim was hypnotized by a clinical psychologist about a month after the
night in question. While in a hypnotic state, and "without prompting, ' 73
she was able to recall the events and implicate the defendant. Given a post
hypnotic suggestion to remember what she had related under hypnosis, she
recounted the same story at trial. 74
The admission of her testimony was upheld on appeal. The court found
that the witness had "recited the facts and stated she was doing so from her
own recollection. The fact that she . . . achieved her knowledge after being
hypnotized concerns the question of the weight of the evidence which the
trier of fact, in this case the jury, must decide." ' 75 In examining the victim's
testimonial evidence, the court found other indicia of reliability in the
corroborating facts, the credentials of the hypnotist, and his testimony that
he did not prompt the victim and had no reason to doubt the truth of her
statement. 76 The court also noted that the trial judge had instructed the jury
to give the hypnotically refreshed testimony no more weight than any other
testimony presented in the trial. 77
The Harding court did not treat hypnotically refreshed testimony as either
scientific evidence or the product of a novel scientific device, but rather as
71. See infra notes 7 -228 and accompanying text.
72. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
73. Id. at 234, 246 A.2d at 305.
74. Id. at 234, 241-42, 246 A.2d at 305, 309.
75. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
76. Id. at 248, 246 A.2d at 312.
77. Id. at 244, 246 A.2d at 310.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
merely another means of refreshing the memory of a witness. Testimonial
lapses in memory are common and the principle of "present recollection
refreshed" is well established law in every American jurisdiction . 7  This
principle allows counsel to refresh the memory of the witness by various
means, including leading questions or the perusal of a document or memo-
randum. 79 Once convinced that the witness is clearly unable to testify due
to a lapse in memory, the courts have been extremely liberal regarding what
may be used to refresh memory. "Anything may in fact revive a memory;
a song, a scent, a photograph, even a past statement known to be false." 80
Or, as another court has stated, it could be "the creaking of a hinge, the
whistling of a tune, the smell of seaweed ... the taste of nutmeg, the touch
of a piece of canvas.""' Once witnesses testify that their memory has been
revived, it is their continued testimony - not the device or article that revived
their memory - that is admitted into evidence. The reliability and credibility
of that testimonial evidence are matters of weight for the trier of fact to
determine.
Although the same court reversed itself fifteen years later,8 2 the approach
it established in 1968 was widely followed by courts in other states during
the next decade. 3 As recently as 1983, one court observed that "[u]ntil 1980
the Harding rule has been uniformly, almost automatically, followed in other
jurisdictions and still commands a majority. ' 84 Other courts tended to
embrace Harding uncritically85 and added nothing to Harding's rationale
78. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 438 (1976).
79. See generally 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 758-63 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970); C. Mc-
CORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9, at 14-19 (2d ed. 1972).
80. United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806 (1946).
81. Fanelli v. United States Gypsum Co., 141 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1944). While courts
have been liberal regarding what may be used to refresh a witness's memory, it is within a
court's discretion to determine if the memory of the witness is indeed impaired and in need of
such aid. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 79, § 9.
82. State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
83. See, e.g., Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974) (evidence not tainted
by pretrial hypnosis); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979) (hypnosis
not unduly suggestive); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981) (hypnosis evidence not inadmissible as a matter of law); State
v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978) (credibility of testimony was a matter for the
jury); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. I, 492 P.2d 312 (1971) (credibility was issue for jury and
cross examination was effective safeguard); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1.982)
(appellant's attack on credibility of witness was an issue for the jury).
84. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 538, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 262, 453 N.E.2d 484, 491
(1983).
85. In overruling Harding, the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed a number of cases that
followed Harding and found "little discussion ... other than reliance upon Harding. "' State
v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 693, 464 A.2d 1028, 1035 (1983). The "lack of careful judicial
scrutiny" and "the dearth of helpful precedent" in the cases following Harding is also noted
in Margolin & Coliver, supra note 42, at 45. See also State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 229-30,
624 P.2d 1274, 1277-78 (1981) (Harding handled admissibility cursorily and subsequent cases
failed to analyze effects of hypnosis); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 770-71 (Minn. 1980)
(assumptions of Harding unwarranted).
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other than to point out that skillful cross-examination of the previously
hypnotized witness would act as a safeguard and would assist the trier of
fact to evaluate the reliability of the hypnotized witness's testimony. s6 While
some courts did reconsider the issue and overrule themselves, others first
adopted or reaffirmed their earlier adoption of the Harding rule, even after
the Maryland Court of Appeals overruled Harding in 1983.87
There have been relatively few cases that involve the admissibility of
hypnotically refreshed testimony in federal court. s8 Among the federal circuit
courts of appeal, most have not addressed the issue at all, two have only
tangentially touched the issue,89 and another has dodged the issue.9 The two
circuits that have directly tackled the issue adopted, at least initially, a
position similar to Harding.
The Ninth Circuit has, among federal courts, been the most active in
ruling on hypnotically refreshed testimony. In Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller
Corp.,91 the court applied the Harding approach in a civil case.
In Wyller, the victim-plaintiff was the sole survivor and only eyewitness
of a helicopter crash. His recollection was impaired by the trauma of the
accident and a four-year delay in litigation. He underwent hypnosis prior to
trial to refresh his memory. 92 On appeal, the court rejected the defense
counsel's argument that the plaintiff's post-hypnotic testimony was "inher-
ently untrustworthy." 93 The court stated that the witness "testified from his
present recollection, refreshed by the treatments. ' 94 The court noted that
86. See, e.g., State v. McQueen, 295 N.C., 96, 120-121, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-28 (1978);
State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971).
87. See, e.g., State v. Little, 34 CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2338 (Mo. App. 1984) (state has
burden of proving absence of impermissibly suggestive hypnotic session); State v. Brown, 337
N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983) (attack on credibility is proper method of determining value of
hypnotically induced testimony); Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 1985) (attack on credibility,
not on competency, is proper method for determining value of testimony; testimony of previously
hypnotized witness did not violate defendant's right of confrontation).
88. Perhaps this is the case because most trials involving the use of hypnotically enhanced
testimony are criminal and often involve violent crimes. There is, of course, relatively little
federal criminal law, especially with respect to most common crimes of violence.
89. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 200 (Ist Cir. 1985) ("nothing in the facts of this
case to suggest a degree of unreliability comparable to that associated with witnesses who have
undergone hypnosis"); Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969) (no error in
exclusion of plaintiff's taped statement made under hypnosis because tape did not clarify or
explain, but merely corroborated and restated testimony).
90. United States v. Harvey, 756 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1985):
Whether hypnotically enhanced testimony is admissible is a question of first impres-
sion for this court .... However, it is unnecessary ... to rule on the admissibility
of hypnotically refreshed testimony .... We hold that, because of the overwhelming
evidence of guilt in the present case, substantial rights of appellants were not
affected and thus, even if this testimony was erroneously admitted, the error was
harmless.
Id. at 644-45.
91. 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974).
92. Id. at 508-09.
93. Id. at 509.
94. Id.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
the defense "was entitled to, and did, challenge both the remembered facts
and the hypnosis itself by extensive and thorough cross-examination" 95 of
the plaintiff and the hypnotist. It ruled that "the credibility and weight to
be given such testimony were for the jury to determine. ' 96
The following year, the Ninth Circuit followed Wyller in Kline v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 and found that although the victim-plaintiff had undergone
hypnotic refreshment of her memory, she was competent to testify because
"she was present and personally saw and heard the occurrences at the time
of the accident." 98 The court noted that the "device by which recollection
was refreshed is unusual," but "in legal effect her situation is not different
from that of a witness who claims that his recollection of an event that he
could not earlier remember was revived when he thereafter read a particular
document."99
Three years later, the Ninth Circuit extended this approach to criminal
cases in United States v. Adams.' °° The court, however, observed that
hypnosis "carries a dangerous potential for abuse," and, as a result, rec-
ommended certain minimal procedural safeguards to protect against that
potential.' 0' It nevertheless reasserted its position that "the fact of hypnosis
affects credibility, but not admissibility." 102
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has rendered similar decisions. In
Connolly v. Farmer, 03 the court addressed the issue in a round about fashion.
The court held that it was unnecessary to review whether the trial court
erred by refusing to admit a doctor's testimony and tapes into evidence that
the plaintiff had made under hypnosis. The court reached this decision since
the trial court did admit plaintiff's post-hypnotic testimony. "In effect, the
jury did learn the results of the hypnosis, and no prejudice to plaintiff
resulted from the exclusion of either the doctor's testimony or the tapes."'
'04
In U.S. v. Valdez,105 the Fifth Circuit court directly addressed the issue and
adopted a rule of admissibility for hypnotically refreshed testimony, albeit
differing from Harding in requiring that "adequate procedural safeguards"
be followed. 06
The two circuits discussed above continue, as of 1986, to admit hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony, although both circuits now require procedural
95. Id. at 509-10.
96. Id. at 509.
97. 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975).
98. Id. at 1069.
99. Id. at 1069-70.
100. 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978).
101. Id. at 198-99.
102. Id. at 198.
103. 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973).
104. Id. at 457.
105. 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
106. Id. at 1203.
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safeguards to protect against the hazards of this testimony. 0 7 Federal district
courts generally favor admission of such testimony. 08
C. The Eclipse of Harding and the Rise of Alternative Approaches
Increased use of hypnosis, growing recognition in research, reports of
limitations and problems inherent in the use of hypnosis, and emerging
criticism of the Harding approach, eventually combined to create new pat-
terns of judicial attitudes toward, and treatment of, hypnotically refreshed
testimony. Although distinct from each other, the new patterns had two
things in common: a rejection of the uncritical acceptance of hypnotism as
a method of refreshing memory and, therefore, an unwillingness to freely
admit hypnotically refreshed testimony into evidence.
In the middle to late 1970s, a new form of judicial analysis emerged that
reflected the concerns mentioned above. Courts began to address, at least
implicitly, one or both of the following two questions. First, is hypnosis so
inherently unreliable that, as a matter of law, the results of the procedure
should not be admitted into evidence, either because the use of hypnosis has
destroyed the competence of a witness or because the hypnotically refreshed
testimony of a witness would unduly prejudice or mislead the trier of fact?
There is, of course, another question hidden within this one: unreliable as
to what-as a truth-detection device, or as a memory refresher, or as an
interview technique? Courts can, and have, answered the first question in
different ways because they viewed the nature and purpose of hypnosis
differently, although the decisions do not always clearly reflect the court's
opinion of the nature and purpose of the procedure. In any event, if hypnosis
is considered to be inherently unreliable, then the analysis must stop; the
evidence will be inadmissable, and the second question need not be reached.
If, however, the answer is negative, or at least ambiguous, then the second
question is addressed: admitting that there are certain problems with the
process of hypnotic interviews and defects in hypnotically refreshed memory,
are there procedural safeguards that may be employed to minimize those
hazards to the point where the testimonial product of hypnosis may be safely
admitted by the judge and be evaluated by the trier of fact?
One of the problems associated with the first question is finding a standard
to measure reliability. If hypnotic evidence is considered to be the same as
any other evidence, then the only standard is the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the corresponding state rules (which do not mention reliability, but
107. See, e.g., United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1985) (rationale for admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony
extended by analogy to testimony refreshed by prior narcoanalysis).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252, 282 (D. Mich. 1977): "The
relation of events ... depends on many factors, e.g., the ability to observe, memory, interest,
mental condition, probability and corroboration. Consequently, the resolution of that type of
factual situation has traditionally been the function of the jury and relies on the strength of
the adversarial process." See also United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
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liberally state that relevant evidence is generally admissible), '°9 and evidence
is relevant as long as it is probative regarding any fact of consequence to
the determination of the action."10 If, however, hypnotic evidence is consid-
ered as scientific evidence, then the courts may choose between two standards
of admissibility: (1) the so-called "reliability" or "relevancy" test, which
has been identified with Professor McCormick, and which is nothing more
than the "probative/prejudicial" test of the Federal Rules;"' and (2) the
judicial rule of evidence known as the Frye"2 test, established by a 1923
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. The widely-quoted passage establishing the test reads:
Just when a scientific principle of discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."'
In addition to these two rules or tests, some courts have borrowed from
both to create a hybrid test, the exact nature of which, of course, will vary
with the jurisdiction and the case. ' 4
If the McCormick relevancy test is used, a foundation is laid via expert
testimony on the reliability of the technique, and the evidence derived from
that technique is then admissible if it is relevant and not found by the court
to be unduly prejudicial, misleading, cumulative, etc. "I As Professor Gian-
nelli explains:
Under the relevancy approach, novel scientific evidence is treated the same
as other kinds of evidence. Thus, if an expert testifies that an innovative
technique is valid, a court could find that evidence derived from that
technique is probative. Admissibility, however, would not be automatic.
As with all relevant evidence, a court would have discretion to exclude the
evidence if the probative value were outweighed by considerations of undue
prejudice, misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time.'
If the Frye test is used, proponents of the evidence have a heavier burden
because they are required not only to show that the technique is in the
109. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 402.
110. FED. R. EvID. 401.
Ill. See C. McCoIRICK, supra note 79, at 491.
112. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
113. Id. at 1014.
114. See, e.g., Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985). "Some jurisdictions have held that
the testimony of witnesses who have undergone hypnotic memory enhancement is inadmissible
per se, either because the technique has not been established as reliable under Frye or because
the scientifically recognized danger of unreliability of such testimony outweighs its probative
value as a matter of law, or for a combination of such reasons." Id. at 13.
115. See FED. R. EVID. 401-03.
116. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1204 (1980).
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demonstrable or working stage, but that it is "generally accepted" as reliable
by the appropriate scientific community. As Giannelli states: "In contrast
to the relevancy approach, it is not enough that a qualified expert, or even
several experts, believes that a particular technique has entered the demon-
strable stage: Frye imposes a special burden - the technique must be
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. ""17 Clearly, then,
of the two tests, Frye is the more difficult and restrictive regarding the
admissibility of scientific evidence.
The issues of whether hypnosis, a technique that has been employed for
at least four thousand years, should be treated as a novel type of scientific
evidence, whether Frye is superior to the relevancy test in determining the
scientific reliability of hypnosis, and whether Frye should be applied to
eyewitness testimony, are all questions discussed in section IV of this article.
For now, it is sufficient to note that in the decade following Harding, no
federal appellate court or state supreme court applied the Frye test to analyze
the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony. Apparently, the courts
either were not overly concerned with the reliability of hypnotically refreshed
testimony, or .they did not consider such testimony to be scientific or the
product of a scientific technique or device, or they preferred to leave the
question of reliability, as a component of credibility, to the trier of fact, or
some combination of the above. "Most courts," according to two commen-
tators, "have circumvented the issue by either defense counsel's failure to
raise it before the trial, or simply by treating the issue, ipso facto, as a
matter of credibility for the trier of fact.""' 8
In the middle to late 1970s, as judicial concern over the reliability of
hypnotically refreshed testimony increased, courts became more disposed to
view hypnosis as a science, and hypnotically refreshed memory as a scientific
product. They also became increasingly disposed to choose Frye as the test
of hypnotic reliability. As one court recently explained:
Given the mysterious and unfamiliar nature of hypnosis and its significant
potential for abuse, a number of courts have approached the problem of
hypnotically refreshed testimony as courts have historically dealt with other
novel scientific methods or procedures: through application of the test set
forth in Frye .... ,,9
Interestingly, this was not true in the federal courts, which continued to
ignore or refuse to apply Frye. The federal courts either continued to follow
the Harding approach of admissibility, 20 refused to consider hypnotically
117. Id. at 1205.
118. Alderman & Barrette, supra note 10, at 28 (footnotes omitted).
119. State v. Western, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 283, 475 N.E.2d 809, 810 (1984). This typical
quotation not only implies that hypnosis is a "novel scientific method," but it equates science
with things which are "mysterious and unfamiliar" and which have a "significant potential for
abuse." (citations and footnotes omitted).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1979): "[A]dmissibility
of such evidence has not been an issue in the federal courts of this circuit since Wyller ....
Because there is no issue about the admission of hypnotically refreshed evidence, there is no
need for a foundation concerning the nature and effects of hypnosis."
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refreshed evidence as scientific evidence, rejected Frye as the appropriate
test of reliability, or employed some combination of the above.','
In the state courts, however, beginning with the 1980 case of State v.
Mack,'." the Frye test was planted, took root, and flourished. Since Mack,
every state supreme court that had elected not to follow, or that abandoned,
the Harding approach has invoked and applied the Frye test in some fashion
or another. But the consistent use of the Frye test has not produced consistent
results.
Some courts, like the Mack court, applied Frye and found that hypnosis
was not generally accepted, and hence, unreliable with respect to one or
more purposes. These courts proceeded either to bar testimony regarding
both post and pre-hypnotic memories, or to bar hypnotically refreshed
testimony while admitting testimony relating to pre-hypnotic memory. Other
courts applying Frye found hypnosis to be generally accepted and reliable
with respect to one or more purposes, provided that various procedural
safeguards had been employed to minimize the possibility that unreliable
testimony would result from a previous hypnotic session. These courts
proceeded to admit hypnotic evidence that had been subjected to such
safeguards.
D. Guarded Admissibility: Procedural Guidelines and Balancing Tests
The first state supreme court to articulate clearly and adopt a delineated
procedural approach to hypnosis was the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
1981 case of State v. Hurd.' By the time the court reviewed Hurd, the case
of State v. Mack, 24 which used the Frye test and rejected hypnotic evidence
as unreliable, had been decided. Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court had
three alternative models to choose from: the admissibility approach of
Harding, the per se exclusion approach of Mack, and an alternative proce-
dural safeguard model that had been roughly sketched by the Ninth Circuit
and fine-tuned and applied by some lower state courts. One of those lower
state courts was the trial court in Hurd.
This alternative model recognizes the hazards of hypnosis, especially the
dangers of confabulation and hypersuggestiveness, but asserts that procedural
safeguards can be employed to minimize or negate those problems. The
Ninth Circuit had firmly established the general principle that the fact of
hypnosis goes to the credibility of the testimony and not the admissibility,
but in two cases the court had implicitly qualified the general rule: the
testimony may be inadmissible if the procedures employed during the hyp-
notic session were improper.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
122. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
123. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
124. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
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In United States v. Adams, '" the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed
the concern "that investigatory use of hypnosis on persons who may later
be called upon to testify in court carries a dangerous potential for abuse."'' 2 6
The court stated that "[g]reat care must be exercised to insure that statements
after hypnosis are the product of the subjects' own recollections, rather than
of recall tainted by suggestions received while under hypnosis."', 7 As mini-
mum procedural insurance, the court suggested maintenance of a complete
stenographic record of the hypnosis interview, and added that "an audio or
video recording of the interview would be helpful.' '2 8 The court stated that
only when "the judge, jury, and the opponent know who was present,
questions that were asked, and the witness's responses can the matter be
dealt with effectively.' ' 29 Lastly, the court implied that a "certified" hyp-
notist should conduct the interview.130
Trial procedures that should be followed with respect to these safeguards
were established the following year in the case of United States v. Awkard' 3'
"[o]bjections to the subject testimony on the ground that such procedures
were not followed should be heard by the district judge before trial, or out
of the presence of the jury on voir dire of the witness. If the trial court
overrules the objection and permits the subject to testify, the adverse party
may, if it wishes, expose the details of the hypnosis to the jury.' ' 3 2
In the same year as Awkard, a Wisconsin trial judge established a far
more elaborate set of procedural guidelines in the case of State v. White. 3
In White, the trial judge found that the reliability of testimony free of undue
suggestion and other potential hazards of hypnosis was dependent upon
125. 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978).
126. Id. at 198.
127. Id. at 198-99.
128. Id. at 199, n.12.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 199, n.13.
131. 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 699, n.2. It is interesting to note that this procedure is analoguous, albeit less
detailed and stringent, to the procedures required by the Federal Rules of Evidence to determine
the admissibility of writings which are sought to be used to refresh a witness' recollection. The
Rules provide:
[A~n adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to cross-
examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which
relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed the writing contains matters
not related to the subject matter of the testimony, the court shall examine in camera,
excise any portions not so related and order delivery of the remainder to the party
entitled thereto. Any portions withheld over objections shall be preserved and made
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not
produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make any
order justice requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects not
to comply, the order will be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its
discretion determines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.
FED. R. EviD. 612(2).
133. 26 CRIM. L. REP. 2168 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 1979).
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compliance with nine procedural safeguards. 34 The White court stressed that
compliance with the guidelines did not guarantee admission of the testimony,
nor did failure to comply require automatic exclusion. The guidelines were
designed to assist the trial judge in assessing the reliability of the testimony
of a previously hypnotized witness. "The central inquiry remains whether,
as a result of events occurring during the hypnotic session, any subsequent
statements made by the hypnotized subject should be considered so unreliable
as not to be admissible [sic] at trial."' 3' The White safeguards were based
upon the four guidelines originally suggested by the psychiatrist, Martin
Orne." 6 In 1980, the White guidelines were adopted by courts in New York'
and, in modified form, by the New Jersey trial court"' in Hurd.
134. The nine guidelines are:
1. The person administering the hypnotic session ought to be a mental health
person with special training in the uses of hypnosis, perferably a psychiatrist or
psychologist.
2. This specially trained person should not be informed about the case verbally.
Rather, such person should receive a written memorandum outlining whatever facts
are necessary to know. Care should be exercised to avoid any communication that
might influence the person's opinion.
3. This specially trained person should be an independent professional not
responsible to the prosecution, investigators, or defense.
4. All contact between the specially trained person and the subject should be
videotaped from beginning to end.
5. Nobody representing the police, prosecutor, or defendant should be in the
same room with the specially trained person while working with the subject.
6. Prior to induction a mental health professional should examine the subject
to exclude the possibility that the subject is physically or mentally ill and to confirm
that the subject possesses sufficient judgment, intelligence, and reason to compre-
hend what is happening.
7. The specially trained person should elicit a detailed description of the facts
as the subject believes them to be prior to hypnosis.
8. The specially trained person should strive to avoid adding any new elements
to the subject's description of her/his experience, including any implicit or explicit
cues during the pre-session contact.
9. Consideration should be given to any other evidence tending to corroborate
or challenge the information garnered during the trance or as a result of post-
hypnotic suggestions.
Id.
135. Id. The White guidelines were adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v.
Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 571 n.23, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394-95 (1983).
136. Orne's four guidelines were first proposed in his 1979 article. See Orne, supra note 57.
137. See People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881, 883, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179 (1980) (White
guidelines used as prerequisite to admission of expert testimony on a hypnotic interview to
insure reliability of statements). People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 834-37, 427 N.Y.S.2d
181, 182-84 (1980), is a useful illustration of the discretionary nature of the White guidelines.
The New York court found compliance with the White safeguards even though the hypnotist
had not conducted a pre-hypnotic interview and had been in contact with the local sheriff's
department. Moreover, there had been no transcription or recording of contacts between the
hypnotist and the subject beyond the actual hypnotic session, and the video recording of that
session was poor. Id.
138. State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 363, 414 A.2d 291 (1980).
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In Hurd,3 9 the prosecution's sole witness, a victim of a night knife attack,
was "unable or unwilling" to identify her assailant.' 4 At the suggestion of
the prosecutor's office, the victim underwent hypnosis by a psychiatrist to
enhance her recollection. Through a process of hypnotic revivification, the
victim was able to identify her assailant as the defendant, her former
husband.' 4' Although she subsequently expressed doubts about her identifi-
cation, the police and the psychiatrist encouraged her to stick to it, explaining
to her that unless she made an identification, the defendant would "remain
free to attack her again, possibly leaving her children without a mother.' '14 2
With this encouragement, the victim reaffirmed her identification and the
defendant was indicted as a result. Prior to jury selection, the defense moved
to suppress the proposed in-court identification, arguing that the testimony
failed to meet the Frye test for admissibility of scientific evidence. 43 The
trial court applied Frye but declined to hold that hypnotically refreshed
testimony is per se inadmissible. The court did, however, suppress the
proposed identification because the state failed to meet the court's two-part
test for admissibility.'"
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted the trial court's test
and reasoning. It agreed that hypnotically refreshed testimony must satify
the Frye general acceptance standard of reliability in order to be admitted
into evidence. 145 Unlike the court in Mack, however, it did not demand that
hypnosis be generally accepted as a reliable means of "reviving truthful or
historically accurate recall."'" The Hurd court found that the purpose of
using hypnosis "is not to obtain truth, as a polygraph . . . is supposed to
do," but rather, to overcome anmensia and restore the memory of a wit-
ness.' 47 The court noted that, "in light of this purpose, hypnosis can be
considered reasonably reliable if it is able to yield recollections as accurate
as those of an ordinary witness, which likewise are often historically inac-
curate."' 48 The court examined the evidence submitted at trial and concluded
139. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
140. Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88. The chief suspects were the husband and ex-husband of the
victim. Id.
141. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 88-89. Besides the victim and the psychiatrist, a medical student
and two police officers were present at the session. Id.
142. Id. at 531-32, 432 A.2d at 89.
143. Id. at 532, 432 A.2d at 89.
144. Id. The trial court's test required, first, that the state prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that it complied with six procedural safeguards suggested by Martin Orne, an expert
witness for the defense. State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 363, 414 A.2d 291, 306 (1980).
For an itemization of those safeguards, see infra text accompanying note 151. Second, if these
procedures had been followed, the state would then have to show, again by clear and convincing
evidence, that "there had been no impermissibly suggestive or coercive conduct by the hypnotist
and law enforcement personnel connected with the hypnotic exercise." 173 N.J. Super. at 363,
414 A.2d at 306.
145. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91.
146. Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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that hypnosis was generally accepted as reliable for this purpose if it was
conducted properly and used only in appropriate cases. Thus, the court
formulated the rule that "hypnotically-induced testimony may be admissible
if the proponent of the testimony can demonstrate that the use of hypnosis
in the particular case was a reasonably reliable means of restoring memory
comparable to normal recall .... ,,149
Admissibility is not automatic. Thus, the Hurd court established a two-
step process for determining admissibility. First, after the proponent of
hypnotically refreshed testimony has informed his opponent of his intention
to introduce such testimony and has provided him with a record of the
session, the trial court will conduct a hearing out of the jury's presence to
determine whether the use of hypnosis was appropriate to overcome the
particular type of memory loss involved.15 0 The second step involves a
determination as to whether the procedures used were reasonably a reliable
means of restoring the witness' memory. In order to provide an adequate
record for evaluating reliability of procedures, and to ensure a minimum
level of reliability, the court adopted the six procedural safeguards used by
the trial court:
1) the hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psychiatrist
or psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis;
2) the qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session should be
independent of and not responsible to the prosecutor, investigator,
or the defense;
3) any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel
prior to the hypnotic session must be in written form so that
subsequently the extent of the information the subject received from
the hypnotist may be determined;
4) before induction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain from the
subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers
them, carefully avoiding adding any new elements to the witness'
description of events;
5) all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be recorded
so that a permanent record is available for comparison and study
to establish that the witness has not received information or sug-
gestion which might later be reported as having been first described
by the subject during hypnosis. Videotape should be employed if
possible, but should not be mandatory;
6) only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any
phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and
post-hypnotic interview.'
149. Id.
150. Id. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95.
151. Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97. It is ironic that Dr. Orne, an opponent of the use of
hypnotically refreshed testimony, was the individual who recommended these safeguards orig-
inally. Orne did say, however, that as long as hypnotically refreshed testimony is subject to
independent verification, "its utility is considerable and the risk attached to the procedure
minimal." Orne, supra note 57, at 318. Orne's recommendations are, of course, also the basis
for the guidelines in White, Lewis, and McDowell. See supra notes 134, 137.
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In demonstrating the appropriate use of hypnosis and compliance with the
required procedures, the burden of proof is on the proponent of the evidence
and the standard of proof is by clear and convincing evidence.'52 The court
recognized that this standard is a "heavy burden" but one that is justified
due to "the potential for abuse of hypnosis, the genuine likelihood of error,
and the consequent risk of injustice."' 53
Hurd is arguably the best known case in which a court took a guarded
admissibility approach to hypnotically refreshed testimony by clearly artic-
ulating a list of guidelines designed to protect against undue suggestiveness
and the other risks of hypnosis to assure the reliability of such testimonial
evidence. Numerous other courts have adopted a guarded admissibility ap-
proach to hypnotically refreshed testimony, but the variations in employing
guidelines and tests are so great as to make generalizations extremely difficult.
The term "procedural safeguards" has been treated differently by courts.
To some, like the Hurd court, it has meant the establishment of predicate
guidelines to ensure and measure reliability. To others, especially those courts
that have rejected Frye as an appropriate test, procedural safeguards have
required the use of balancing tests that described and named in various ways
by different courts, but which essentially embody the relevancy and proba-
tive/prejudicial principles of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Texas appellate
courts, for example, ignoring or rejecting Frye, have referred to a "totality
of the circumstances" test.'14 The Fifth Circuit, in rejecting the Frye test as
inappropriate, declined to formulate a list of guidelines, but instead used a
152. Id. at 546-47, 432 A.2d at 97. The court applied this standard to criminal proceedings.
It left unanswered the question of whether the proponent in a civil proceeding also had to
establish the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony by means of the clear and convincing
standard. Also unanswered was whether a proponent in a civil proceeding would need to comply
with all six safeguards. The court did suggest, however, that a recording of the hypnotic session
was an essential minimum requirement. Id.
153. Id. at 547, 432 A.2d at 97-98. The court noted that the imposition of the clear and
convincing standard may relate in an interesting fashion to due process challenges regarding
suggestive identification procedures. The United States Supreme Court has held that "reliability"
is the key in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Manson v. Braithwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). Because the defendant normally bears the burden of demonstrating
the unreliability of an identification procedure by a preponderance of the evidence, any such
due process challenge will be closely related to the threshold question of admissibility of
hypnotically refreshed testimony.
If the hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible because of its unreliability,
there will be no need to consider the due process issue. Conversely, it is difficult
to imagine that an identification would violate due process once the court has
determined that the testimony meets the more stringent standard for reliability we
have established today.
Hurd, 86 N.J. at 548, 432 A.2d at 98.
154. See, e.g., Walters v. State, 680 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App. 1984):
[Tlhis Court rejected mechanistic approaches and emotional overreactions to the
problem of hypnotically refreshed testimony, preferring instead to evaluate such
testimony just as all other evidence is evaluated: Is it reliable? . . . Posthypnotic
testimony is admissible where the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
hypnotic session shows that the session was not so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a substantial likelihood of ... mis-identification.
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test that involved an assessment of relevancy and a balancing of probative
value versus prejudicial value.'55
Even among courts adopting a Hurd-type set of predicate guidelines,
considerable variance exists . An Ohio appellate court has adopted the Hurd
test, using the Frye test to find that hypnosis is generally accepted as a
reliable scientific means of refreshing memory.'5 6 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court rejected the Frye test as inappropriate but has adopted Hurd-type
guidelines (actually the nine guidelines of White). 57 Appellate courts in
Illinois have also rejected Frye as inappropriate and have adopted Hurd
guidelines, although disagreement exists among appellate courts as to the
application of the guidelines to similar fact patterns.' An appellate court
in New Mexico largely ignored the Frye test and adopted the Hurd guide-
lines.5 9 The New Mexico Supreme Court also ignored Frye and cited the
appellate court with approval to affirm a conviction in which the established
Id. at 63. See also Zani v. State, 679 S.W.2d 144, 150 (Tex. App. 1984) ("Posthypnotic
identification testimony by a nondefendant witness is admissible when the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the hypnotic session shows the session was not so impermissibly
suggestive to give rise to a substantial likelihood of an unreliable . . . identification").
155. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (1984).
Our evaluation . . . considers three basic evidentiary precepts: first, the principle
embodied in Federal Rules 402 and 601 that "all relevant evidence is admissible"
and "every person is competent to be a witness," subject only to certain explicit
exceptions; second, the jurisprudential rule that, in determining admissibility, the
trial judge's discretion is wide ... ; and finally, the limiting rule that even relevant
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such
factors as "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury."
Id. at 1201.
156. State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 286-87, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813 (1984).
157. State v. Armstrong, l10 Wis. 2d 555, 567-72, 329 N.W.2d 836 (1983).
158. The guidelines used in Illinois differ from those accepted by Hurd. Although the purposes
of assuring, and measuring, reliability are the same, the guidelines are less stringent in deter-
mining the threshold question of admissibility since emphasis is placed on the trier-of-fact's
evaluation of reliability as a component of witness credibility. The guidelines, established in
People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979), involve an examination of the
qualifications and independence of the hypnotist, the presence or absence of suggestiveness in
the hypnotic session, the existence of independent corroboration of witness testimony, the
opportunity of the witness to observe the events which he or she purported to recall during
hypnosis, and the similarity of the witness' pre-hypnotic and post-hypnotic statements.
The application of these guidelines to similar fact patterns has, however, led to different
emphases and conclusions. In People v. Gibson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (1983),
the court held that it was error (albeit harmless) to admit the testimony of a previously
hypnotized witness because the hypnotic session had been conducted by an unqualified hyp-
notist-a police officer with one week of hypnosis training at police school. In People v.
Cohoon, 120 Ill. App. 3d 62, 457 N.E.2d 263 (1984), however, the court rejected the Gibson
court's application of the Smrekar guidelines, holding that a police officer with 30 hours of
training was a qualified hypnotist. Concerning the guideline of consonance of the pre-hypnotic
and post-hypnotic statements, the Cohoon court seemed impressed that the only difference
between the victim's original description of her attacker and the description given under hypnosis
was that during the latter she remembered that the rapist had very large ears.
159. State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (App. Ct. 1981).
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guidelines had not been followed. The court justified its decision instead on
the consonance of the pre-hypnotic and post-hypnotic statements of the
witness. 60 Oregon has codified Hurd-type guidelines that require that the
hypnotic session be recorded and made available to the adverse party as a
precondition to admissibility.1 61
Elsewhere, Alabama has straddled the fence, holding that Frye is the
appropriate test for hypnotically refreshed testimony but refusing to apply
either a per se rule of admissibility or inadmissibility, and failing to adopt
procedural guidelines. The Alabama court, nevertheless, cautions proponents
of such testimony to use safeguards to assure reliability. 62 Lousiana's Su-
preme Court has rejected a per se exclusion rule 63 but also refused to
establish procedural guidelines. Instead they have advised law enforcement
authorities to follow "the guidelines and safeguards adopted in other juris-
dictions." 64
What almost all of these courts have in common is an aversion to the
exclusion of relevant evidence, a recognition of the risks of hypnotically
refreshed testimony, and a belief that procedural safeguards in the form of
predicate guidelines and/or balancing tests can minimize or negate those
risks. The guarded admissibility approach, then, rejects the unquestioning
admissibility approach of Harding without automatically excluding relevant
evidence by means of the per se inadmissibility approach of Mack.
E. The Per Se Exclusion Approach: Hypnotic Evidence Fried by Frye
While many courts responded to the potential hazards of hypnosis by
employing balancing tests and procedural guidelines to ensure reliability,
other courts, beginning with State v. Mack, 6 have dealt with the problems
of hypnotically refreshed testimony by simply excluding such testimony.
These courts find hypnosis, and its products or results, to be scientifically
unreliable and have excluded hypnotically refreshed testimony by means of
a per se rule of inadmissibility. Such a rule is, of course, a draconian device
that effectively renders a previously hypnotized witness incompetent, at least
regarding the details of the hypnotic session and any memories recalled by
means of hypnosis. Nonetheless, this approach to the problem is popular.
In the five years following the Mack decision, a per se rule of inadmissibility
160. State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 661 P.2d 1315 (1983).
161. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 136.675, 136.685, 136.695 (1977). See also State v. Luther, 663 P.2d
1261 (1983) (judicial application of the statute).
162. In Prewitt v. State, 460 So. 2d 296 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), the court stated: "We
caution those who so use it to properly document pre-hypnosis evidence to insure its admissibility
in appropriate cases and refute claims that it is somehow 'tainted' by hypnosis. We also caution
the proponents of hypnotic evidence to take every possible precaution to assure its reliability."
Id. at 304.
163. State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983).
164. State v. Goutro, 444 So. 2d 615, 618 (La. 1984).
165. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
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was adopted by the high courts in more than a dozen states and by lower
appellate courts in several other states.- 6
Among the courts taking this approach, "[t]he most frequently employed
rationale used to support a per se ban on the use of hypnotically refreshed
testimony is that hypnosis as a memory enhancing technique fails. . . . (T]he
general test for the admission of evidence resulting from the use of a new
scientific technique originally articulated in Frye .... ,,167 Actually, these
courts have invariably used the Frye test, or the "theory underlying Frye, "1,61
to bar this hypnotically refreshed testimony. 69 The only variance among
these courts is in their enthusiasm for the Frye test and in their interpretation
of what the test is supposed to measure.
Several cases are especially noteworty: State v. Mack, 70 People v. Shir-
ley, '7 State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 172 and State v. Collins.'73 Mack
is noteworthy because of its bold break from the Harding approach. 74 Shirley
has attracted attention and criticism for its sweeping scope and for its
polemical tone.'" State ex rel. Collins attracted attention for its supplemental
opinion that modified its original holding announced just four months
previously. In State v. Collins, the Maryland Supreme Court undercut the
foundation for the per se admissibility approach when it overruled its prior
holding in Harding.
State v. Mack involved a prosecution in Minnesota for criminal sexual
conduct and aggravated assault. The victim, apparently intoxicated and
suffering from various "emotional problems" at the time of the incident,
gave medical personnel and police conflicting versions as to how she acquired
a serious injury to her vagina. 76 At the instigation of the police, the victim
underwent hypnosis by a self-taught lay hypnotist. During the session,
attended by two police officers, the victim recalled that her injury had been
inflicted by the repeated plunging of a switchblade knife, wielded by the
defendant. 77 The defendant was subsequently arrested but moved to suppress
166. See State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984) (list of cases applying per se
inadmissibility rule).
167. State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 567, 329 N.W.2d 386, 392 (1982).
168. State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 511, 319 S.E.2d, 177, 187 (1984).
169. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601 (Del. Super. 1985) (hypnosis scientifically
unreliable).
170. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
171. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal. Reptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775 (1982).
172. 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
173. 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
174. Prior to Mack, courts followed Harding and admitted hypnotically refreshed testimony.
Courts refused td admit hypnotic evidence only if such evidence consisted of prior out-of-court
statements made by the witness while actually under hypnosis. See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 263
S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
175. People v. Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 926, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 500-01 (1982)
(Gardner, J., concurring) ("Shirley is really more of a polemic than an opinion. As a polemic
it makes interesting reading.").
176. 292 N.W.2d at 765-66.
177. Id. at 766.
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the victim's testimony on the grounds that it was unreliable and that it would
deny his right to confront the witness.""8 The trial court certified the issue
of admissibility to the Minnesota Supreme Court after an extensive hearing
on the motion to suppress.
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered legal and scientific authority'7 9
and determined that "although hypnotically-adduced memory is not strictly
analogous to the results of mechanically testing, we are persuaded that the
Frye rule is equally applicable in this context."'' 0 The court then reviewed
the expert testimony and found that although there was agreement that
"historically valid memory can result from hypnotic recall,"' 8' there were
also indications of hypnotic hazards. The court noted the following problems:
(1) the subject's increased susceptibility to suggestion; (2) the subject's
tendency to creatively fill in gaps in memory; (3) the inability of the subject
or of experts to determine which parts are fanciful, and which are lies; and
(4) the' "hardening" of memory, which makes the subject convinced of the
truth of hypnotically recalled accounts and which would make it impossible
to meaningfully cross-examine the witness. 82 For these reasons, the court
concluded that hypnotically refreshed testimony was not scientifically reliable
in being historically "accurate."' 83 Thus, unlike Hurd, in which the court
found hypnosis to be reliable in yielding "recollections as accurate as those
of an ordinary witness, which likewise are often historically inaccurate,"' 8 4
the Mack court found hypnosis to be unreliable by applying Frye to a higher
standard of historical accuracy.
Within the following year and a half, the highest courts in Arizona,'8"
California, 8 6 Michigan,8 7 Nebraska,88 and Pennsylvania' 9 followed the ex-
ample set by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Mack. In each case, the courts
examined the issue of admissibility of testimony by a previously hypnotized
witness, used some application of the Frye test to conclude that hypnosis
was not generally accepted as a reliable scientific technique of restoring
178. Id. at 767. The court did not rule on the confrontation right argument because it found
for the defendant on the issue of admissibility. Id. at 772.
179. The Minnesota State Public Defender and the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
filed amicus curiae briefs. Five experts on hypnosis testified at the trial hearing. Id. at 765-66.
180. Id. at 768.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 768-69.
183. Id. at 768.
184. 86 N.J. 525, 538 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981).
185. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981) (post-hypnotic testimony excluded
until hypnosis gains general acceptance as reliable tool to restore memory accurately).
186. State v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775 (1982) (lack of
reliability of statements following hypnosis renders testimony inadmissible).
187. State v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982) (hypnosis to enhance memory
not yet proven reliable).
188. State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981) (hypnotic evidence inadmissible
until hypnosis gains wide acceptance as accurately improving memory).
189. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981) (hypnosis has gained
sufficient acceptance as means of accurate restoration of memory).
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historically accurate memory, and barred the admissibility of such testimony.
This effectively rendered the witness incompetent. In these cases, the question
of whether testimony relating to pre-hypnotic memory was included in the
ban was either unanswered or was answered in the affirmative. Belatedly
recognizing the severe burdens that a total ban would place on the police
and the prosecution, the courts in five of the six states mentioned above
moved with suprising speed to clarify or to modify their decisions in order
to allow witnesses to testify regarding those matters that they were able to
recall prior to hypnosis. By the end of 1983, only the California Supreme
Court had retained, as it still does, its sweeping rule that the testimony of
previously hypnotized witness is "inadmissible as to all matters relating to
those events [in issue], from the time of the hypnotic session forward."' 9
No other high court has subsequently adopted California's approach.
The California decision of People v. Shirley is significant for reasons other
than its singular sweeping rule of inadmissibility. The alternative procedural
safeguard approach had been established by the time of the Shirley decision,
and had gained authority and forward inertia as a result of the 1981 decision
in State v. Hurd. Thus, the court in Shirley not only had the opportunity
to reaffirm and broaden the Mack approach, but it also had the opportunity
to attack the procedural guidelines approach of Hurd.
The facts in Shirley represented a classic case of a rape prosecution in
which the only two witnesses had conflicting versions of the same events,
with the victim alleging rape and the defendant claiming voluntary partici-
pation. In order to "fill the gaps" in her stories,' 9' the victim was hypnotized
by a deputy district attorney three months after the events in question. The
defense moved to suppress the complainant's testimony on the ground that
"this is an improper use of hypnosis" because "it is not in fact refreshing
190. 31 Cal. 3d at 47, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272, 641 P.2d at 804.
191. 31 Cal. 3d 18 at 25-29, 181 Cal. Rptr. 248 at 245-48, 641 P.2d 775 at 777-80. The
complainant's refreshed testimony was not only in sharp contrast to her statements made prior
to hypnosis, but she continued to contradict her own testimony during the trial. "[Hler testimony
was vague, changeable, self-contradictory, or prone to unexplained lapses in memory. Indeed,
on occasion she professed to be unable to remember assertions that she herself made on the
witness stand only the previous day." Id. at 24, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 245, 641 P.2d at 777. Her
inconsistent and self-contradictory testimony may be partly attributed to the fact that she was
intoxicated during a portion of the period in question and had shortly thereafter consumed 100
milligrams of Mellaril, a major tranquilizer used for treatment of psychotic states, schizophrenia,
and manic-depressive cases. Id. at 24-29, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 245-48, 641 P.2d at 777-780. One
may question the suitability of hypnosis to refresh the memory of a woman who "was having
problems," "couldn't be emotionally turned on by men," and yet had seven children in the
"Knightstown Home for Children," and who used "Mellaril and alcohol frequently." Id. One
may wonder how much memory she had to be "refreshed" by hypnosis, yet, curiously, the
majority did not address this question. Only Justice Kaus, concurring and dissenting, noted
that "it is by no means clear to me that the facts of this case are typical of hypnosis cases in
general." Id. at 74, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 277, 641 P.2d at 809. The majority did, however, hold
that complainant's intoxication had not rendered her incompetent as a witness. Id. at 72, 181
Cal. Rptr. at 276, 641 P.2d at 807. In other words, the majority believed that the jury was
capable of weighing the possible effects of alcohol and tranquilizers on the memory of a
witness, but not capable of weighing the possible effects of hypnosis on a witness' memory.
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a witness's recollection" but "it is in fact manufactured evidence." 192 The
trial court denied the motion on the ground that the fact of hypnosis went
to the credibility of the witness not to the admissibility of her testimony. At
trial, the defense produced only one expert witness, who testified that there
is significant danger that hypnosis can result in inaccurate memory. 193
Although the trial court did not address the issue of admissibility in terms
of the Frye test, on appeal, the California Supreme Court deemed it appro-
priate to decide the issue using the Frye test. The supreme court relied on
the sole witness who testified at trial as well as various scientific and legal
literature to conclude that it is not generally accepted that hypnosis produces
reliable memory restoration. 94 Although the language of the Shirley opinion
is somewhat muddled, the majority apparently considered reliable memory
to be historically accurate memory. The majority considered hypnosis to be
unreliable in restoring historically accurate memory, reasoning that the sub-
ject's increased susceptibility to suggestion and tendency to confabulate or
lose critical judgment about his memory rendered the subject objectively
unable to distinguish accurate memory from confabulation, notwithstanding
the subjective belief that his post-hypnotic memory was accurate. 95
The majority stated that the procedural safeguards approach failed because
it does not avoid the problems of confabulation, the subject's increased
confidence in post-hypnotic memory, and loss of critical judgment. 9 Noting
that the Attorney General proposed no safeguards to deal with those prob-
lems, the court added that even if guidelines had been proposed and adopted,
they doubted that such guidelines could be administered "without injecting
undue delay and confusion into the judicial process."' 197 The court referred
to the Hurd guidelines as "pretense" and rejected any attempt at formulating
such guidelines, stating that "the game is not worth the candle."'' 98
Having found hypnotically refreshed testimony to be unreliable and having
rejected procedural safeguards to ensure and measure reliability, the court
held that the testimony of witnesses who have undergone hypnosis for the
purpose of restoring their niemory of the events in issue is inadmissible as
to all matters relating to those events "from the time of the hypnotic session
forward."' 99 The court stated that this rule did not foreclose the continued
use of hypnosis for investigative purposes. However, the court proposed no
guidelines for use in investigations, and reiterated that anyone hypnotized
for such purposes "will not be allowed to testify as a witness to the events
of the crime. '200
192. Id. at 29, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 248, 641 P.2d at 780.
193. Id. at 31-32, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 250, 641 P.2d at 781-82.
194. Id. at 53-59, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 263-66, 641 P.2d at 795-98.
195. Id. at 64-66, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271-72, 641 P.2d at 802-04.
196. Id. at 39, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255, 641 P.2d at 787.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 47, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272, 641 P.2d at 804.
200. Id. at 67-68, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74, 641 P.2d at 805.
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Shirley has been sharply criticized for, among other reasons, its language
and tone, its broad ban on pre-hypnotic and post-hypnotic testimony, its
application of the Frye test, and its practical foreclosure of investigative uses
of hypnosis.2 °0 In an attempt to mitigate the harsher effects of a Shirley-
type rule, the state supreme courts that had rendered similar or analogous
decisions moved to clarify or modify their opinions. In short order, the
supreme courts in Arizona, 202 Michigan,0 3 Nebraska, 204 Pennsylvania,0 5 and
Minnesota2 06 rendered decisions that retained a ban on post-hypnotic mem-
ory, but that allowed witnesses to testify as to matters they recalled prior to
hypnosis.
In January of 1982, the Arizona Supreme Court initially ruled in State ex
201. See, e.g., State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Comment, People
v. Shirley: An Unwarranted Per Se Exclusion of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony? 14 Sw.
U.L. REv. 777 (1984). What is perhaps the strongest criticism of the language and tone of
Shirley may be Justice Gardner's concurring opinion in People v. Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d
920, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1982):
Shirley is more of a polemic than an opinion. As a polemic it makes interesting
reading. The protagonists are so clearly defined.
The prohypnosis expert is a lowly police psychologist, wretchedly educated
("Ed. E."), who is, of all things, a director of a "proprietary school" . . . . (Just
what that has to do with this case escapes me.)
On the other hand, the anti-hypnosis experts are "highly experienced," "na-
tionally known," "pioneers," and "respected authorities" who present the "gen-
erally accepted view" which is set forth in "scholarly articles" and "leading scientific
studies." Thus, the guys in the white hats and those in the black hats are clearly
defined and appropriately labeled.
Somehow, lost in the shuffle, is the fact that the majority rule in this country
is that hypnotically induced testimony is admissible.
According to Shirley, cases following that rule rely on an authority which
"summarily disposed" of this issue with "little or no analysis." The part I really
like is the classification of all contra authorities as "moribund."
Of course the cases to the contrary [to the Harding and Hurd approaches] are
"well reasoned" and "leading." Certainly.
Id. at 926-27, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01 (citations omitted).
202. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
203. People v. Gonzales, 417 Mich. 968, 336 N.W.2d 451 (1982). The Michigan Supreme
Court modified an earlier ruling in the same case, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743, stating that
it had not announced a per se prohibition on the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness.
On remand, the court of appeals decided that a witness was not disqualified from testifying
regarding pre-hypnotic information. People v. Perry, 126 Mich. App. 86, 337 N.W.2d 324
(1983). The Michigan Supreme Court later approved of the appellate court's approach by
People v. Nixon, 364 N.W.2d 593 (Mich. 1984) (witness may testify at trial to facts which the
witness recalled and related prior to hypnosis).
204. State v. Patterson, 213 Neb. 686, 331 N.W.2d 500 (1983).
205. Commonwealth v. Smoyer, 476 A.2d 1304 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 249
Pa. Super. 171, 439 A.2d 803 (1982).
206. State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1981).
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rel. Collins v. Superior Court207 that any person who had been hypnotized
would "be incompetent to testify to any fact. ' 20 8 Justice O'Holohan filed a
forceful dissent, pointing out some of the negative practical effects of such
a holding.3 9 The state's motion for a rehearing was granted and the supreme
court delivered an extensive supplemental opinion in May of 1982, which
modified its January opinion.210
The court's supplemental opinion noted that the month and a half old
decision in People v. Shirley had found the Frye test useful in serving "the
salutary purpose of preventing the jury from being misled by unproven and
ultimately unsound scientific methods. 2 1' The court then offered its version
of the Frye test, holding that it is satisfied when knowledgeable experts
"have come to recognize the methodology as having sufficient scientific basis
to produce reasonably uniform and reliable results that will contribute
materially to the ascertainment of the truth. 2 1 2 Having said that, the court
did not rely on expert testimony but upon a review of case law plus some
scientific and legal commentary to find that hypnosis was unreliable due to
a variety of factors." 3 Analyzing procedural safeguards, the court found
that such procedures may increase the reliability of hypnosis and allow it
"to cross the Frye threshold.11 4 Ultimately, however, they rejected the
safeguard approach because it "will consume too much in the way of judicial
resources, will produce conflicting results in different trial courts, and will
produce few situations in which hypnotic recall is ever admitted.""' 5
The court then recognized that hypnosis has value for investigative pur-
poses; the use of hypnosis for those purposes somehow entails less serious
risks. Consequently, the court modified its January opinion, holding that a
previously hypnotized witness could testify "with regard to those matters
which he or she was able to recall and relate prior to hypnosis. ' 2 6 The court
ruled, however, that any investigating party is henceforth required to record
207. 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
208. Id. at 193, 644 P.2d at 1279 (Feldman, J., supplemental opinion). The court had earlier
extended its rule of total incompetency to civil cases in Lemieux v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz.
214, 644 P.2d 1300 (1982).
209. "It is indeed a sorry result when the victim of a rape cannot even take the stand to say
she was raped." 132 Ariz. at 192, 644 P.2d at 1279.
210. "A decent respect for the doctrine of stare decisis [is overcome] ... where issues of
important public policy are involved . . . [and] . . . where the rule in question is not of long-
standing duration." Id. at 194, 644 P.2d at 1280 (Feldman, J., supplemental opinion).
211. Id. at 199, 644 P.2d at 1285.
212. Id.
213. The court enumerated the various familiar problems: hypersuggestibility, hypercompli-
ance, confabulation, increased subject confidence in recalled memories, and inability to distin-
guish between true memories and pseudo memories. The latter two problems impair effective
cross-examination and effectively deny the defendant the right to confront an accusor. Id. at
200-05, 644 P.2d at 1286-1292.
214. Id. at 202-07, 644 P.2d at 1288-93.
215. Id. at 208, 644 P.2d at 1294.
216. Id. at 209, 644 P.2d at 1295.
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a witness' pre-hypnotic recollections prior to placing the witness under
hypnosis." 7 Admission of pre-hypnotic testimony absent such a procedure
would be error. Finally, the court suggested that parties intending to use
hypnosis for investigative purposes follow some, if not all, of the Orne
procedural guidelines.2 t
Over the next three years, courts in several states followed the approach
of per se exclusion of post-hypnotic testimony. In addition to the states
mentioned above, the approach has been clearly adopted by courts in Col-
orado,2t9 Massachusetts,2 ° New York, 22' Maryland,222 North Carolina,2
Oklahoma, 2 4 Washington,225 Delaware,2 26 and most recently Florida.2 27 Of
these, Maryland's adoption was especially notable, for in overruling Harding,
the supreme court undercut the foundation of the admissibility approach.228
While all of the states mentioned in this section, except California, allow
pre-hypnotic testimony, most have either required or suggested guidelines
for investigative parties in order to avoid "tainting" pre-hypnotic memories
with post-hypnotic memories.
IV. ANALYSIS
Three competing approaches to the issue of admissibility of previously
hypnotized witnesses now exist: the admissibility approach, the, guarded
admissibility approach, and the per se exclusion approach. While it is difficult
to describe the last approach as the "majority" position, its adoption is at
least currently a strong, if not dominant, trend among state courts. This is
unfortunate, for it is the approach of per se exclusion that contains the most
significant analytical flaws and produces the most serious negative practical
effects.
A. Critique of the Per Se Exclusion Approach
Courts excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony have done so primarily
because in applying some variation of the Frye test, they have found that
217. Id. at 210, 644 P.2d at 1296.
218. Id.
219. People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. App. 1982).
220. Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190.
221. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 452 N.Y.S.2d 408, 453 N.E.2d 484 (1983).
222. State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
223. State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984).
224. Robinson v. State, 677 P.2d 1080 (OkI. Crim. 1984).
225. State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984).
226. State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
227. Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985).
228. The influence of the recent Maryland decision in State v. Collins, supra note 222, can
be seen in the North Carolina decision of State v. Peoples, supra note 223: "We followed
Harding in McQueen and the recent overruling of Harding . . . erases the cornerstone of the
credibility approach to hypnotically refreshed testimony and, hence, the basic premise of
McQueen." 311 N.C. at 532, 319 S.E.2d at 187.
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hypnosis lacks general scientific acceptance as a means of restoring histori-
cally accurate memory. Hypnotically refreshed testimony is unreliable as
scientific evidence and must not be admitted lest it confuse or mislead the
trier of fact. While this argument may seem superficially appealing, close
scrutiny reveals a number of analytical flaws.
First, the Frye test is not an appropriate method of determining whether
hypnotically refreshed testimony is admissible. As previously discussed, the
Frye test explicitly applies to the admissibility of expert opinion deduced
from a scientific test or principle. As it was originally applied, "the Frye
test prevented an expert from vouching for the credibility of a witness and
then supporting his (the expert's) testimony by reference to some scientific
principle that purportedly proved that the initial witness was telling the
truth. ' '229 Applying Frye in order to exclude eyewitness testimony is clearly
an improper use of the test. In rejecting Frye's applicability to hypnosis, the
Alaska Court of Appeals correctly noted that "[sitrictly speaking, no expert
is involved. '230 What is involved is eyewitness testimony which, whether
refreshed by hypnosis or not, is simply not the same thing as expert opinion
deduced from a scientific test. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
stated: "The issue here is not the admissibility of a hypnotist's observations
or statements made by the witness during hypnosis but instead the admis-
sibility of the testimony of a lay witness in a normal, waking state." ' To
use the Frye test to exclude such testimony is "to turn the . .. test on its
head." 23 2
Secondly, mere employment of the Frye test will not exclude hypnotically
refreshed testimony if the court applies the standard correctly in framing the
issue. If the court understands the true nature and purpose of hypnosis it
will frame the issue, as the court did in State v. Hurd, by inquiring as to
whether hypnosis is generally accepted as a "reliable means of restoring
memory comparable to normal recall. '233 Even critics of the use of hypnosis
do not deny that the technique may enhance the memory of a witness.234
229. State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792, 817 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
230. Id. at 816.
231. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1984).
232. Contreras, 674 P.2d at 817. The Alaska Court of Appeals was harshly critical of the
California Supreme Court's use of the Frye test in its Shirley decision.
In Shirley the California Supreme Court permitted an expert, Dr. Diamond, to
attack the credibility of a class of witnesses, i.e., those who had been hypnotized
prior to trial, based on scientific principles derived from the results of studies of
the impact of improper interrogation techniques on the memory of hypnotized
subjects. Based on this testimony, the California Supreme Court disqualified pre-
viously hypnotized witnesses as a class. Curiously, the court did not examine whether
Dr. Diamond's views had received general scientific acceptance. Dr. Diamond readily
concedes that his view regarding the effects of memory distortion in eyewitnesses
is a minority view among experts familiar with the subject.
Id. (footnote omitted).
233. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 528, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981).
234. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 1, at 340; Orne, supra note 57, at 317-18.
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Properly framing the issue according to the nature and purpose of hypnosis
can easily enable a court to conclude, as the Hurd court did, that hypnosis
is generally accepted as a reasonably reliable method of restoring a person's
memory, at least "[i]f it is conducted properly and used only in appropriate
cases.' '23
The analytical error lies in incorrectly framing the issue by asking whether
hypnosis is generally accepted as reliable in producing historically accurate
memory. Framing the issue in this fashion ignores the nature and purpose
of hypnosis and creates a discriminatory and unrealistic standard.23 6 The
Frye test is normally employed as a standard in assessing the reliability of
expert opinion and experimental data commonly associated with technolog-
ical devices capable of producing objectively measurable results. 237 Unlike
the technological hardware with which some courts have forced it to asso-
ciate, hypnosis has no dials to spin; it produces no hard results capable of
precise and objective calibration or measurement. Most importantly, hypnosis
is a technique that may prove to be helpful in refreshing the memory of a
witness. It is not a guarantor of truth or of historical accuracy and should
not be treated as such. Given popular misconceptions about hypnosis, it is
understandable that some courts have equated hypnosis with techniques such
as narcoanalysis and with machines such as polygraphs. But while this
comparison may be understandable, it is nonetheless incorrect, as two writers
have stated:
Requiring hypnosis to perform a truth-determinant function ...distorts
the scientific process and aborts its potential benefit to litigation. The
value of hynosis lies in its scientifically-established reliability as a device
for retrieving relevant testimony previously forgotten or psychologically
repressed, regardless of the factual truth or falsity of that testimony.'"
A third flaw in the per se exclusionary-approach is the assumption that
hypnotically refreshed testimony is qualitatively different from, and inferior
235. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 528, 432 A.2d at 92.
236. The standard of historical accuracy is discriminatory because it is applied selectively.
Courts do not demand that the memories of non-hypnotized witnesses be historically accurate.
This standard is unrealistic because by requiring historical accuracy, the courts equate reliability
with infallibility, for one cannot be "a little" historically accurate any more than one can be
"a little" pregnant. McCormick has noted that courts using the Frye test tend to require that
scientific techniques produce infallible results. He has criticized that tendency by pointing out
that a requirement of infallibility effectively eliminates the need to ask the scientific community
whether a device produces results generally accepted as reliable. "In the case of matters labelled
'lie detector,' 'truth serum,' 'voiceprint,' . . . the courts seem to conclude that the jury will
consider the tests infallible, and so require that they be shown to be infallible before they are
submitted." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 79. at 490 n.32.
237. The Frye test has been applied, inter alia, to neutron activation analysis, ion miroprobic
analysis, atomic absorption, remote electro-magnetic sensing, bitemark comparisons, sound
spectrometry, gaschrome-biographic analysis, chromotographic analysis, and forward looking
infrared systems. See Giannelli, supra note 116, at 1198-1201 (list of cases applying Frye types
of novel scientific evidence). Amidst this array of evidence from the natural sciences, hypnosis
appears, and is incongruously placed.
238. Spector & Foster, supra note 7, at 584.
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to, other memory. It is not. Courts that have refused to admit hypnotically
refreshed testimony have recited the litany of potential hypnotic dangers:
suggestibility, hypercompliance, confabulation, deliberate falsification, and
an increased witness confidence in, and a "hardening" of, hypnotically
refreshed testimony. What these courts fail to realize, or at least admit, is
that these phenomena are not exclusive to memory enhanced by hypnosis.
They are phenomena that may afflict, just as easily and in equal measure,
the memory of non-hypnotized witnesses. Our minds selectively record and
store information and as new data is incrementally added, original percep-
tions become distorted and so intermixed with subsequent additions that it
becomes impossible to distinguish original perceptions from sequential in-
crements. As a noted authority on memory, Dr. E. F. Loftus, explains:
Memory is imperfect. This is because we often do not see things accurately
in the first place. But even if we take in a reasonably accurate picture of
some experience, it does not necessarily stay perfectly intact in memory
.... The memory traces can actually undergo distortion. With the passage
of time, with proper motivation, with the introduction of special kinds of
interfering facts, the memory traces seem sometimes to change or become
transformed. These distortions can be quite frightening, for they can cause
us to have memories of things that never happened.2 '
On a daily basis, we round out incomplete knowledge by confabulating,
filling in gaps in our memory with our "biases, expectations, and past
knowledges." 240
Inaccuracies in normal memory may become magnified in the mind of an
individual who has been a victim or witness of a crime. 24' Eyewitness
testimony often is further distorted by the process of interrogation by police
and lawyers. 242 One court recently observed that "the danger of confabula-
tion, the danger that information supplied through suggestion will become
a part of a witness's memory, and the danger that the witness will be as
confident about the inaccurate recollections as the accurate recollections, are
possible side effects of the interrogation process. ' 243 Increased confidence
239. E. LoFTus, MEMORY 37 (1980).
240. Id. at 40.
241. See E. LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); P. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
IN CRIMINAL CASES 1965); Loftus, Eyewitness: Essential But Unreliable, 18 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
22 (1984); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreli-
ability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977).
242. See Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, Effect of Kind of Question and Atmosphere of
Interrogation on Accuracy and Completeness of Testimony, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1620 (1971).
243. Contreras, 674 P.2d at 817. The court concluded that, because of the variables of
witness motivation and the interrogation process, any effect of the hypnotic process could be
produced in a non-hypnotized witness:
Further .... any hypnotic effect will be duplicate with a subject who has not been
hypnotized, so long as the subject has sufficient interest in the success of the
experiment and rapport with the experimentor .... lilt would be inappropriate to
say that a previously hypnotized witness's trial testimony was any more the product
of the hypnotic session than a nonhypnotized witness's trial testimony is the product
of the interviews she previously had with police and prosecutors.
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and hardening of testimony may occur in non-hypnotized witnesses simply
as a result of cross examination.'" Because of the similarity of problems
between hypnotically refreshed testimony and normal testimony, the exclu-
sion of the former is completely unwarranted.145 In fact, where a qualified
hypnotist follows predicate guidelines designed to avoid these problems,
hypnotically refreshed testimony should prove more reliable than testimony
not subject to such safeguards.246
The per se exclusionary approach not only contains serious analytical
flaws, it also poses significant practical problems as well. The total exclu-
sionary approach of Shirley was criticized as effectively ending the investi-
gatory use of hypnosis by law enforcement agencies 27 and as being unduly
Id. The Alaska Court of Appeals relied heavily on the work of psychologist Thomas Barber,
who explains hypnotic behavior as a function of the subject's attitudes, motivations, and
expectations of a given experiment. Barber argues that any effect of hypnosis can be duplicated
without a formal hypnotic induction process. See T. BARBER, HYPNOSIS: A SCIENTFIC APPROACH
(1969); Barber & Calverley, Empirical Evidence for a Theory of Hypnotic Behavior: Effects on
Suggestibility of Five Variables Typically Included in Hypnotic Induction Procedures, 29 J.
CONSULTING PSYCH. 98 (1965). The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525,
543, 432 A.2d 86, 94 (1981), did not refer to Barber but recognized other psychological research
that demonstrates the similarity of problems common to both normal and hypnotically enhanced
memory. The California Supreme Court, in People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal. Rptr.
243, 641 P.2d 775 (1982), did not adequately take into account this similarity, and Justice
Kaus, concurring and dissenting, was sharply critical of the majority for its failure to do so.
Id. at 76, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 279, 641 P.2d at 810 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
244. Two commentators note that cross-examination may cause the witness to feel attacked
and abused. "This kind of interrogation may force the witness to defend his perception and
memory of the event and elicit defense mechanisms that make the witness appear more assertive
and confident than the accuracy of his testimony may warrant." Spector & Foster, supra note
7, at 584.
245. One court has noted:
The argument that previously hypnotized witnesses should be disqualified from
testifying gains force only if hypnotism creates a risk of distorting memory that is
substantially greater than, or qualitatively distinct from, the risk ordinarily posed
by interrogating a victim who has rapport with her questioner and who has a vital
interest in the identification of her assailant. In contrast, if improper interrogative
techniques and the normal experiences encountered by eyewitnesses account for
virtually all instances of memory distortion, then no special rule for hypnotism
would appear warranted.
Contreras, 674 P.2d at 802.
246. Some commentators have observed that:
Itihe array of complexities inherent in the attempt to glean accurate information,
while relying upon the functioning of errant human faculties, encourages support
for the courts' responsiveness to testimony retrieved through pretrial hypnotic
induction. A witness whose memory has been refreshed through hypnosis may be
able to recount an observed event more fully and accurately than any other witness.
Spector & Foster, supra note 7, at 590.
247. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 193, 644 P.2d 1266,
1277 (1982) (Holohan, C.J. dissenting from original opinion) ("[n]o law enforcement agency
can risk using hypnosis because the person subjected to hypnosis cannot thereafter be used as
a witness").
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harsh on victims of crime. 2 8 To avoid the problems resulting from Shirley's
total ban, other per se exclusionary approach courts have adopted a modified
rule that permits a witness to testify as to facts remembered prior to hypnosis.
Unfortunately, this compromise rule only creates additional problems. It is
illogical and unworkable. It presupposes that a witness had 249 a pre-hypnotic
memory of which a record has been made. If both of those assumptions
prove correct, then the witness may testify only with respect to what is on
the record. 20 This may raise ethical problems for a witness who may be
forced to violate his oath by testifying to pre-hypnotic memory he no longer
accepts as truth, as well as for a prosecutor who may be forced to violate
disciplinary rules by instructing the witness to stick to a record the witness
no longer accepts as true. The rule also creates tactical problems for the
defense, whose cross-examination is restricted by fear of eliciting recall
tainted by hypnosis. The rule creates a procedural nightmare for the trial
judge who must insure that the parties do not stray from the pre-hypnotic
script. 25' Additionally, while the modified rule was adopted in part to en-
courage investigatory uses of hypnosis, it does not have that effect. Many
of these courts have stated that even pre-hypnotic evidence would be barred
unless proper procedural hypnotic safeguards were used, but they have not
specified what those safeguards are. 252 Guessing at procedures must have a
chilling effect on law enforcement authorities and others wishing to use
hypnosis. Lastly, these per se exclusionary-approach courts seem to ignore
248. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 928, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (1982)
(Gardner, J., concurring) ("The idea that the predator may testify and yet his victim may not
offends my sense of justice. It appears to me that the scales of justice are tilted-dangerously").
Williams is one of several decisions in which California appellate courts have, by distinguishing
facts or interpretations of Shirley, evaded the precedent of their own state's highest court. See,
e.g., People v. Glaude, 141 Cal. App. 3d 633, 190 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1983) (admission of testimony
not prejudicial to defendant); People v. Parrison, 137 Cal. App. 3d 529, 187 Cal. Rptr. 123
(1982) (using test of relevancy, not Frye, to admit hypnotic testimony); People v. Adams, 137
Cal. App. 3d 346, 187 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1982) (hypnotic testimony uncontaminated, unlike
Shirley).
249. The past tense is used because, by the reasoning of these courts, it is impossible for a
person to "have" a pre-hypnotic memory. Exclusionary-approach courts assert that the act of
hypnosis terminates pre-hypnotic memory and substitutes a new, inaccurate, and unreliable
memory.
250. In this situation there is no real need for the witness to testify, for the record itself can
be admitted either under the recorded recollection hearsay exception of FED. R. EVID. 803(5)
or, if the requisite conditions are met, under the former testimony hearsay exception of FED.
R. EVID. 804(B)(1).
251. Most of the problems of the modified rule discussed in the text to this point are treated
in greater detail in State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 201, 644 P.2d 1266,
1297-98 (1982) (Gordon, V.C.J., concurring and dissenting).
252. The Collins court is one of several courts that did not specify what hypnotic standards
were necessary, and Vice Chief Justice Gordon, concurring and dissenting, criticized that
omission. "I would not have litigants guess at which or how many standards would be enough
to satisfy this Court that pre-hypnotic testimony was properly admitted." Id. at 202, 644 P.2d
at 1299 (Gordon, V.C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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the fact that if a witness had a good pre-hypnotic memory, it is unlikely
that hypnosis would have been needed to refresh it. Ergo, the only memory
to which a previously hypnotized witness may testify to is a faulty memory
in need of refreshing.
A final criticism of the per se exclusion approach concerns both the Frye
test and the reasons why some courts have applied it to hypnosis. One of
the purported advantages of the Frye standard is that it "promotes uniformity
of decision." 2" As has been seen, however, uniformity has not been achieved.
There have been inconsistencies in application and in results. Some courts
have used the Frye standard, while others have rejected it as inappropriate.
Among those courts that have employed the test, some have found hypnot-
ically adduced evidence to be reliable, while others have not. McCormick
has labelled the application of the test as "highly selective," ' 25' and Giannelli
has observed that "inconsistencies in application abound." 2" As to why this
is the case, Professor Giannelli argues that instead of using Frye as a neutral
tool, "it appears that many courts apply it as a label to justify their own
views about the reliability of particular forensic techniques. 2 6 Similarly,
Professor Weyrauch has observed that rules of evidence function as "legal
masks" that hide the deep-seated value choices of judges. 2 7 One can only
speculate as to the true reasons why some judges have chosen to exclude
hypnotically refreshed testimony. Perhaps they genuinely misunderstand the
nature and purpose of hypnosis. Perhaps they distrust the ability of jurors
to properly weigh such testimony. Perhaps they fear such testimony will
excessively benefit the prosecution in criminal cases. 2 8
A better approach would require judges to cease hiding behind the mask
of the Frye reliability test and openly expose and clearly articulate their true
reasons for rejecting hypnotically refreshed testimony so that their concerns
may be adequately debated and evaluated. Such debate is foreclosed and
justice is impaired by the expedient employment of an inappropriate standard
that may result in an automatic and overly broad exclusion of relevant
evidence. 59
253. Margolin & Coliver, supra note 42, at 47.
254. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at 490.
255. Giannelli, supra note 116, at 1219.
256. Id.
257. Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 710-77
(1978).
258. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 530, 452 N.Y.S.2d 408, 415, 453 N.E.2d
484, 491 (1983) ("like the present case, evidence is usually offered by the prosecutor"); State
v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 770 ("significant, however, that this . .. clearly favors only the
prosecution").
259. In declaring previously hypnotized witnesses competent to testify, the Contreras court
was critical of courts that seemed more concerned with developing general evidentiary rules
than with the interests of justice in the particular case before them.
We recognized that a number of the cases addressing these issues approach them
from a slightly different perspective. They view the case sub judice purely as a
vehicle for announcement of a broad prophylactic rule of general application. To
reach a conclusion these cases ask whether pretrial hypnotism is a good or bad
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B. Critique of the Admissibility Approach
The admissibility approach presents certain advantages. It does not au-
tomatically disqualify an entire class of witnesses. It encourages the use of
hypnosis as an investigatory tool. Perhaps most importantly, it allows rele-
vant testimony to reach the trier of fact. However, the approach has several
serious defects that render it unacceptable.
First, the approach fails to adequately recognize the potential for the abuse
of hypnosis. While it is true that the possible negative effects of hypnosis
may be produced in non-hypnotized witnesses, there is a difference between
hypnosis and other techniques of investigation and interrogation. Hypnosis
is inherently suggestive; the subject must be willing to comply with sugges-
tions if hypnosis is to have any value. The danger lies in the possibility that
the hypnotist will, either inadvertently or deliberately, suggest the identity
or culpability of a suspect. This danger is greatest when hypnosis is performed
by unqualified personnel and/or law enforcement authorities or their agents.
In allowing the testimony of all previously hypnotized witnesses to reach the
trier of fact, the court does not bar evidence made unreliable by undue
suggestiveness.
Courts taking the admissibility approach answer that reliability is a com-
ponent of credibility and is, as such, to be evaluated by the trier of fact.
But this answer only betrays a second defect of this approach. Unlike most
methods of refreshing the memory of a witness, hypnosis normally takes
place prior to trial. Absent a video tape recording, the jury is unable to
observe the demeanor of the witness prior to hypnosis. Absent assurances
that procedural guidelines were followed to prevent suggestiveness, the jury
has no way of knowing whether, or to what extent, suggestiveness occurred.
The trier of fact, in short, has a markedly impaired ability to evaluate
adequately either the reliability of the hypnotic procedures or the credibility
of the witness' hypnotically refreshed memory.
A third, closely related, deficiency of this approach is that by placing such
an unrealistic burden on the jury, the trial judge abdicates some of his own
responsibility. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and analogous state
evidentiary rules, a trial judge must subject even relevant evidence to a
probative/prejudicial test. A per se admissibility approach effectively evades
this obligation, shifting it to litigating counsel and the jury.
In United States v. Valdez,260 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged the potential value of hypnotically adduced evidence but found
practice as a general rule . . . . These conclusions motivate these courts to establish
a "per se" rule barring testimony by witnesses hypnotized prior to trial . . . . [T]he
cases before us are not solely vehicles for the announcement of general rules of
evidence. They are equally concerned with whether Contreras sexually assaulted S.
J. and E. L. and whether Grumbles burglarized Hall's residence and assaulted her.
674 P.2d 792, 795-96 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
260. 722 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1984) (concluding that prejudicial effect outweighs
probative value where a hypnotized subject identifies for the first time a person he has reason
to know is already under suspicion).
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reversible error in the decision of a United States district court to admit
such evidence by means of a per se rule of admissibility, as opposed to an
application of the probative value versus the prejudicial value test. The court
stated:
Post-hypnotic testimony can obviously be relevant .... And we cannot
say that it is always without probative value. In this case, however, the
district court did not expressly weigh probative value against potential for
prejudice. Admissibility was based instead on a rule of law decision that
post-hypnotic testimony was admissible and the jury might assess credi-
bility.2-
A final problem with this approach is that the rule of per se admissibility
of hypnotically adduced evidence does nothing to encourage law enforcement
agencies and other investigators to employ qualified hypnotists and to follow
procedures designed to avoid improper suggestions and to minimize other
risks of hypnotic interrogation. Lacking any incentive to invest time, money,
and effort in obtaining trained personnel and in using proper procedures,
many agencies will understandably use personnel and procedures that, how-
ever unintentionally, increase the probability of distorting the memory of a
witness and prejudicing the rights of a defendant. 262
C. Critique of the Guarded Admissibility Approach
The guarded admissibility approach has been subjected to various criti-
cisms, especially by the courts that have rejected it in favor of a rule of per
se exclusion. One of the more common criticisms is that the use of predicate
guidelines does not adequately ensure reliability of testimony because the
guidelines only protect against suggestiveness and not against the other risks
of hypnosis. 263 This argument is meritless since it misunderstands the nature
and purpose of both hypnosis and the guidelines. As previously stated, the
purpose of hypnosis is to refresh memory and not to guarantee truth.261 The
guidelines ensure that proper hypnotic procedures are used. As previously
261. Id. at 1201.
262. One of the better known recent decisions taking a general admissibility approach is
Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). The facts represent a near-perfect antithesis of
the Orne safeguards. The hypnotist was a police officer with little training in hypnosis. There
was no record made of the witness' recollection prior to hypnosis. Several other people, including
police officers, were present at the hypnotic sessions. No written transcript of the sessions was
made nor did anyone take notes. The sessions were videotaped but one videotape was lost and
the other two were mostly inaudible. In his dissent, Justice Brown took note of these facts in
commenting: "Stripped of its veneer, this case holds that a police officer who occasionally
plays around with hypnotism can manipulate the recall of a witness and receive the blessing of
this court .... The admission of hypnotically enhanced testimony, developed by a rank
amateur absent any scientific procedure is totally unreliable." Id. at 1286-87 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
263. See, e.g., People v. Hughes. 59 N.Y.2d 523, 543-44, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 265-66, 453
N.E.2d 484, 494-95 (1983); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255, 641
P.2d 775, 786-87 (1982).
264. See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
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shown, if proper hypnotic procedures are used, restored memory should be
at least as reliable as the memory of a non-hypnotized witness. 265
The approach has also been criticized on the gound that the monitoring
of compliance with the guidelines would prove difficult in practice, would
be time consuming, and would not lead to uniform results. 26 These are
ironic criticisms in view of the inconsistencies arid practical problems of the
per se exclusion approach. 267 They are also of little merit. A guarded ad-
missibility approach provides a general standard in asserting that hypnotically
refreshed testimony is reliable when hypnotic procedures were conducted
properly. Guidelines provide uniformity of investigative practices within the
jurisdiction. As investigative bodies and courts become familiar with the
guidelines, the monitoring of compliance should be easier and inconsistent
results should be minimized. In any event, inconsistencies due to the pecul-
iarities of a given case and any increased judicial expenditure of time in
reviewing the facts of each case seem preferable to the intentional exclusion
of relevant evidence and the disqualification of a class of witnesses.
Another criticism of the guarded admissibility approach is that it may
admit evidence that could confuse the trier of fact since "[hypnosis is
cloaked in a veil of mysticism. ' 2 68 The same courts assert, however para-
doxically, that because jurors are confused by hypnosis, they will give it
added weight and place "undue emphasis on what transpired during a
hypnotic session. 2 69 This criticism exhibits an unfounded mistrust of jurors
which, fortunately, all courts do not share.2 70 Complex litigation, often
involving expert testimony on subjects more esoteric than hypnosis, is a
common feature of modern trials. There is no reason to isolate hypnosis as
ipso facto confusing. Besides, as one judge commented in a recent hypnotism
decision, "I am firmly of the belief that jurors are quite capable of seeing
through flaky testimony and pseudo-scientific claptrap. '271 Vigorous cross-
examination and cautionary instructions from the bench should adequately
assist juries in this task.
265. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text. As the Contreras court noted, the Orne
safeguards specifically protect against confabulation as well as suggestion. Confabulation occurs
when someone with no memory of an event is placed under pressure to recall a memory by
someone he wishes to please. The Orne safeguards attempt to minimize the pressure on the
witness to have memories. State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792, 809 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
266. Such a "time consuming and expensive course is precisely what the [Frye] tests seeks
to avoid." Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 526, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1196 (1983); see
also People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 30, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255, 641 P.2d 775, 787 (1982);
People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710, 712-13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
267. See supra notes 249-59 and accompanying text.
268. State ex. rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 186, 644 P.2d 1266, 1272 (1983).
269. Id.
270. "We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for
evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are
not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony
that has some questionable feature." Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).
271. People v. Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 928, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (1982) (Gardner,
J., concurring).
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Given the previous discussions of the analytical and practical shortcomings
of the approaches of per se exclusion and of per se admissibility, it is obvious
that an alternative to both approaches is preferable. Although it too has
suffered criticism, the guarded admissibility approach appears, on balance,
to offer the best solution to the problems of hypnotically refreshed testimony.
Perhaps the central problem with this approach is that its component
elements lack clear definition. Some courts have emphasized the probative/
prejudicial test of the Federal Rules of Evidence or analogous state eviden-
tiary rules.2 72 Other courts have emphasized predicate guidelines. 273 Among
the latter, some have referred to guidelines only vaguely, while most have
articulated an explicit set of suggested or required guidelines. Among the
courts requiring guidelines, there has not been complete agreement as to
what the guidelines should require, although all of the guideline sets have
their primordial genesis in the safeguards proposed by Martin Orne. 2
74
In the author's opinion, a guarded admissibility approach should contain
three elements: (1) the establishment of predicate guidelines for hypnotic
use, (2) the use of the probative/prejudicial analysis, and (3) the consideration
of the existence and nature of corroborating evidence.
The establishment of procedural guidelines is the best way to ensure that
investigatory bodies will use hypnosis only in appropriate cases, and that
they will conduct hypnotic interviews only with qualified personnel who
utilize procedures designed to protect against the attendant hazards of the
hypnotic interview process. Appropriate use and procedural compliance should
be determined by the court at a hearing out of the jury's presence. As the
Hurd court required, the burden of proof should be on the proponent of
the evidence and the standard of proof should be that of clear and convincing
evidence.2 7
In deciding which guidelines to promulgate, the court has a variety of existing
sets from which to choose. The guideline sets adopted by courts to date are
understandably similar to one another, and all are adequate. Preferable to them,
however, the guidelines known as the "Federal Model," 2 ' a standard used by
the investigative departments of the Armed Services, the Secret Service, the
Treasury Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2" The "Federal
272. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (Sth Cir. 1984); Zani v. State,
679 S.W.2d 144, 150 (Tex. App. 1984); Walters v. State, 680 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. App. 1984).
273. See, e.g., People v. Smrekar, 68 III. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v.
Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 475 N.E.2d
805 (1984); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 55, 329 N.W.2d 836 (1983).
274. See supra notes 128-51 and accompanying text.
275. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 547, 432 A.2d. 86, 97-98 (1981).
276. See Ault, FBI Guidelines for Use of Hypnosis, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNosIs 449-51 (1979); Hibler, supra note 57, at 555-57.
277. The Federal Model, in contrast to Orne's recommendations, requires that an investigator
be present during the hypnotic session. In the FBI version, the investigator is known as the
"coordinating Agent," an individual who has been trained, not as a hypnotist, but in the
theory, techniques, and hazards of hypnosis. The required guidelines are contained in a checklist
used by the coordinating Agent. The checklist is partially reprinted below:
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Model" is also similar to Orne's, 2'" but it is an improvement on earlier models
Preliminary
i. Only witnesses and victims should be hypnotized and only after other
methods of investigation have been exhausted ....
2. Refer to and follow existing FBI policy.




- Properly cleared personnel to operate equipment.
- A proper briefing for camera crew.
4. Choice of professional-only a psychiatrist, psychologist, physician, or den-
tist ....
5. Items to be discussed with professional:
- FBI requirements.
- Dangers of cueing.
- Desire for coordinator to do the interviewing. [This is not an inflexible
rule. At this time, many psychiatrists and psychologists have done
enough work with FBI Agents that the professional himself can and
does conduct much of the interview.]
- Agreement on payment ....
- Long-term arrangements, such as the possibility of obtaining security
clearance for the doctor and the doctor's future participation in FBI
cases.
- Comfort of witness.
The Hypnosis Session
I. The preinduction interview, that portion conducted on tape prior to the
hypnosis session, should include:
- Discussion of hypnotist's background.
- Voluntary participation of witness. Signing consent form.
- Brief description of procedures.
- Removal of misconceptions.
- Discussion of basic health of witness . . .Any health problems must
be resolved prior to interview.
2. Prior to taped interview, coordinating Agent will confer with others who
may be present to advise them of the need for keeping quiet and unobtrusive.
3. Prior to hypnotic induction, the witness will be allowed to relax and recount
all the details he/she can recall of the incident in question. Do not lead or
question. Merely allow the witness to recount details in any order he desires.
4. The induction will be done by the professional. The coordinator should note
for his records the doctor's opinion of the depth of the trance and by what
method the doctor estimates that depth.
5. The doctor may then transfer rapport to the coordinator for questioning
about the incident. The coordinator will again simply let the witness recall
the incident without prompting. After the witness has recalled the incident,
the coordinator may go back and "zero in" on specific details.
6. Rapport will be transferred back to the doctor who will dehypnotize the
witness. The doctor is in charge of the session.
7. The original video tapes obtained from the interview are evidence and are
treated accordingly. The chain of custody is maintained, and the tapes are
provided to the Behavioral Science Unit of the Training Division at the FBI
Academy for assessment and research.
Ault, Hypnosis-The FBI's Team Approach, 49 FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT BULL. 5, 5-8 (1980);
Hibler, supra note 57, at 555-57.
278. The Federal Model is similar to Orne's safeguards except that the federal guidelines are
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because it is richer in protective detail and because it expands "the concept of
procedural safeguards beyond the hypnotic interview to the more basic con-
siderations of circumstances for which such interviews are warranted." 2'9 By
placing "appropriate use" within the guidelines, the "Federal Model" saves
the court the task of making a separate determination. If it finds compliance
with the guidelines, appropriate use is guaranteed. 8 '
After the court has determined that its hypnotic procedural guidelines
have been followed, the court should apply the probative/prejudicial bal-
ancing test of the Federal Rules of Evidence or analogous state evidentiary
rules. E"' Procedural guidelines, for all of their importance, are not suggested
procedures to guide investigatory agencies and courts. Even if all of the
guidelines are followed, the court may justifiably conclude that the hypnot-
ically adduced evidence is irrelevant because it is not probative, or that its-
probative value is substantially outweighed by its potentially prejudicial
effect.
Alternatively, the evidence could be admitted even if some of the guidelines
were not followed if the court determines, under the totality of the circum-
stances, that the hypnotic process was not unduly suggestive and that the
resulting evidence is sufficiently probative. The Federal Rules of Evidence
create a presumption in favor of the admission of relevant evidence. If the
guidelines are followed, the trial judge will likely find the hypnotically
refreshed memory of the witness .to be as reliable as that of an ordinary
witness. Therefore, sufficiently probative and non-prejudicial testimony should
be put before the trier of fact. Nonetheless, guidelines cannot take away the
sound discretion of the trial judge nor can they remove the court's respon-
sibility to exercise such discretion.
Lastly, in applying this probative/prejudicial analysis, the court should
consider the existence of corroborating evidence. This is not to say that
more detailed, indicate appropriate uses of hypnosis, proscribe inappropriate uses, and provide
for the presence of an investigator at the hypnotic interview. By providing that both a qualified
hypnotist and a trained criminal investigator be present at the interview, "there is confidence
that the well-being of the interviewee, the stipulated use of hypnosis, and the proper forensic
exploration of the event in question are maintained. Thus, investigators do not function as
doctors, and doctors do not function as investigators." Hibler, supra note 53, at 55.
279. Id. at 53.
280. Under the Federal Model, hypnosis is appropriate when all of the following conditions
apply: (I) as a last resort in an attempt to provide information obtainable by no other means;
(2) where a felony offense is involved; (3) where the witness or victim was able to perceive
details which may have the potential for further enhancement; and (4) where there is the
likelihood of independent corroboration. Hypnosis should not be used in known-subjects cases
and may not be used where the credibility of the interviewee is in question or the witness has
a medical or psychological history that indicates that hypnosis could exacerbate that condition.
Id. at 54-55.
281. Evidence is relevant if it is probative. All relevant evidence should be admitted unless
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury. See FEDERAL R. EVID. 401-03.
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corroborating evidence should be the only factor used to determine the
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony. A judge may have sound
reasons for admitting, or refusing to admit, such testimony apart from the
issue of corroborating evidence. The existence of corroborating evidence is,
however, a powerful guarantor of the reliability and probative value of
hypnotically refreshed testimony. 2 If the "Federal Model" is used for
procedural guidelines, corroborating evidence should always exist by the time
of trial. The model precludes the use of hypnosis absent the likelihood of
independent corroboration and states that information obtained through
hypnosis may not form the basis of investigative conclusions without cor-
roboration evidence.2 8 3
V. CONCLUSION
Hypnosis is a valuable technique to assist a witness to recall previously
forgotten or psychologically repressed memories. Its use, however, is not
without some risk that a hypnotized subject will recall false memories. This
risk is greatest when unqualified personnel induce hypnosis by using improper
procedures. Many state courts have recently responded to this risk by ex-
cluding per se the testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses, holding that
hypnosis is unreliable as a means of producing historially accurate recall.
This approach is unwarranted-it distorts the nature and purpose of hyp-
nosis, exaggerates hypnotic risks, and fails to adequately consider the ability
of procedural guidelines and balancing tests to ensure the reliability of
hypnotically refreshed testimony. Moreover, this approach is undesirable
because it discourages the investigatory uses of hypnosis by law enforcement
agencies and excludes relevant evidence by rendering virtually incompetent
an entire class of witnesses.
On the other hand, almost equally unacceptable is the older judicial
approach of per se admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony, which
leaves to the jury the role of according proper weight to such evidence. This
approach ignores the differences between hypnotism and other means of
refreshing the memory of a witness and overlooks the possiblity of undue
suggestiveness during the hypnotic interview. It places an unrealistic burden
282. It is interesting to observe that corroborating evidence existed in many of the cases
using a guarded admissibility approach, and the courts noted this fact in their decisions. On
the other hand, in a number of cases using a per se exclusion approach (e.g., Mack, Shirley),
corroborating evidence was absent, yet the courts seemed to ignore this fact. "Since the cases
adopting per se rules are frequently cases in which eyewitness testimony was not corroborated,
it is strange that the courts do not even consider limiting the per se rule to cases in which no
corroboration exists." State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792, 816 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
283. Hibler, supra note 53, at 54. Even in the absence of the Federal Model, the percentage
of corroboration may be quite high. "A police study of the Los Angeles Police Department
demonstrated that 91% of all testimony from 500 witnesses under hypnosis was verified by
independent corroboration." Comment, Hypnosis: A Primer For Admissibility, 5 GLENDALE L.
REV. 51, 61 (1983).
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on the factfinder and does nothing to encourage law enforcement authorities
to use proper hypnotic procedures and qualified personnel.
Between these two extremes lies the approach of guarded admissibility.
Under this approach, a court would, ideally, adopt hypnotic procedural
guidelines, consider corroborating evidence or its absence, and employ stand-
ard probative/prejudicial analysis in determining the admissibility of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony in a given case. Procedural guidelines guarantee
that undue suggestion did not occur during hypnosis and that the refreshed
memory of the witness is as reliable as that of a non-hypnotized witness.
Corroborating evidence further guarantees the reliability and probative value
of hypnotically refreshed testimony. If, considering the totally of the cir-
cumstances, standard evidentiary analysis determines that the probative value
of the testimony is high and that its prejudicial potential is low, the testimony
should be admitted. Vigorous cross examination by counsel and cautionary
instructions from the bench will assist the jury, the final determiner of truth,
in properly weighing the credibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony.
